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ABSTRACT
American industry expends substantial sums for fire protection,
fire prevention programs, first-aid facilities, and industrial safety-
programs. These expenditures grow out of proper recognition of the
economic necessity to minimize loss caused by disasters such as fire,
flood, explosion, etc*
There is, however, the general lack of a program which pre-
assigns specific responsibilities to employees, upon the occurrence
of an emergency situation, which could reduce significantly the ex-
tent of damage.
The purpose of this paper is to present a model industrial dis-
aster control plan which was developed for use at the Overhaul and
Repair Facility, Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida, and which
utilizes those techniques heretofore applied primarily by shipboard
Damage Control organizations.
The industrial manager alone can decide whether a similar appli-
cation of Damage Control principles within his organization can be
beneficial. To facilitate the making of this decision, a cost
equation for use in computing plan implementation costs is provided.
Further, the paper presents a method of approach, involving Simulation
techniques, for individual company assessment of the potential value
of plan installation in addition to the benefit derived by reduction
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THE NEED FOR CHANGE
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF SHIP DESIGNERS AND SHIP OPERATORS AS
RELATED TO DAMAGE CONTROL
The present-day Naval attack carrier with its mobility, speed,
and strike capability represents different things to different people
.
To a potential aggressor, it represents a deterrent force which for
adaptability and flexibility is unparalleled by any other weapon system
in being today. To the average American citizen, it represents one of
a vast array of instruments designed for his protection, and not inci-
dentally, one of the reasons why he is relieved of the problems
attendant to spending approximately 20% of his income. To the builders
and operators of this awesome weapon, it represents the lessons learned
through research, operation, and often sad experience in the effort to
produce an effective platform for the launching and recovery of aircraft a
It is by addressal to the working principles developed by the last
mentioned group that we expect to show the possibilities for similar
application to industry.
It would be an unwarranted oversimplification to say that the
designers of a Naval vessel concern themselves with only the immediate
operational requirements involved in its use. They must also concern
themselves with ways to limit flooding if it does occur, with maintaining
stability by counter-flooding, with strengthening weakened structural

members, -with the fighting of fire, and -with the clearing sway of
wreckage. Officers and crew must maintain an organization comprised
of personnel, equipment, routine drills, and special procedures de-
signed to minimize the effects of damage sustained by a ship.
DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL DAMAGE CONTROL CONCEPT
Further, it would be historically inaccurate to say that ship-
board Damage Control techniques have enjoyed a steadily expanding
growth over the years. It was not until the early days of World War II
that Damage Control began to receive the interest and attention ap-
propriate to its importance. During this period, understandable
concern was in evidence over attempts to explain why one ship, after
sustaining a certain amount and type of battle damage, was lost, and
another similar type ship, after receiving substantially the same
damage, survived to fight again. On investigation, the explanation
was invariably grounded in what actions had been taken by the crew—
before and after the battle—to minimize the effect of damage.
OBJECTIVES OF NAVAL DAMAGE CONTROL
Out of this experience with Naval ships has emerged the body of
knowledge and procedure broadly described as Damage Control, and in-
tended for use in attaining the following basic objectives: 1) To
Bureau of Shios Technical Manual (NavShips 250-000-88) Sec. II
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p 505°

take all practicable preliminary measures, before damage occurs, such
as maintenance of watertight integrity and fumetight integrity, pro-
vision of reserve buoyancy and stability, removal of fire hazards, and
upkeep and distribution of emergency equipment, 2) To minimize and
localize such damage as does occur, by such measures as control of
flooding, preservation of stability and buoyancy, combating fire, and
first-aid treatment of personnel, 3) to accomplish as quickly as
possible emergency repairs or restorations, after the occurrence of
damage, by measures such as supplying of casualty power , regaining
of a safe margin of stability and buoyancy, replacement of essential
structure, and manning of essential equipment..
DAMAGE CONTROL TRAINING PHASES: PASSIVE AND ACTIVE
Damage Control training aboard a ship revolves around two phases:
the passive and the active phase. The passive phase concerns those
steps which can be taken in advance of impending,, forecast, or po-
tential emergency which will reduce the possibility of spreading damage;
such steps as the closing of doors, the re-routing of steam, the securing
of unneeded electrical circuits, the purging of unused fuel lines , the
securing of ventilation systems, the activation of emergency communi-
cation systems, and the donning of protective personnel equipment are
all examples of "passive" damage control measures • All of these steps
may be accomplished in advance of, for instance, a bomb attack or a
forecast storm, and each one in itself could minimize the possibility

of personal injury. The other phase, the active nhase of Damage Control
is that portion which takes place after an incident f such as a bomb hit,
an explosion, or an outbreak of fire<> Such incidents would create the
scene for the introduction of personnel specially trained in rapid re-
covery action.
A meaningful illustration of the value of a highly developed
Damage Control organization can be drawn through description of an
engine room fire occurring aboard the attack carrier USS SARATOGA off
the coast of Greece in 1961.
A fuel line had parted and sprayed hot fuel oil over several
pieces of rotating equipment in the ship , s number 2 engine room;
instantly there was a flash fire that engulfed the entire combination
engine and boiler room. The alarm was spread , and immediately, person-
nel throughout the shio who had been trained to the point of automatic
reaction, began to take action aD-orooriate to the nature of the
emergency. Ventilating systems for the engine room were secured to
deny a necessary element of combustion; electrical circuitry in the
immediate area of the fire was deenergized, and those circuits that
could not be opened without affecting the ship's ability to remain
fully operational were rerouted around the fire; auxiliary propulsion
systems were placed "on the line" to maintain ship mobility; trained
fire fighting and first-aid teams were mustered, briefed on the lo-
cation and nature of the fire, and dispatched to the scene
•
This fire claimed the lives of seven men; however , had proper

training ?nd indoctrination of the crew in Damage Control not taken
place, had scheduled and unscheduled drills in Damage Control pro-
cedures not been made a part of the ship's training routine until the
crew reaction was immediate upon receipt of the alarm , the loss of
seven lives conceivably could have been multiplied many times over.
SARATOGA lost little of her mobility and speed throughout the
entire period that the fire was being contained and brought under
control, and the ship was in a position at all times to launch and
recover her aircraft on a moment's notice had the need developed.
Incidents such as this have shown the potential value of a
coordinated plan of action within each operating unit of the Navy
for dealing with unforeseen events—and equally important, they show
the absolute necessity for continuing efforts in this area to develop
better methods and procedures, to build ships with awareness of the
problems of effective Damage Control, and to recognize that the need
for crew training is of utmost importance.
THE APPLICATION OF NAVAL DAMAGE CONTROL PRINCIPLES 70 AMERICAN INDUSTRY
Do these shipboard concepts of active and passive Damage Control
with their accompanying organization of personnel, equipment, and
training have any application in a shore industrial environment? More
specifically, is there any value to be derived from the formulation and
implementation of a Disaster Control plan in American industry that,
with a proper approach, can draw upon the knowledge and experience of

on-the-job employees in minimizing oamage from fire, floor, hurricanes,
and internally or externally caused explosions?
CURRENT GRC'vl'H TRENDS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY
An answer suggests itself through the consideration of some
current trends in American industry. First, the growth of the
American industrial plant is one of the miracles of the twentieth
century. Its production marvels were major factors in vanning two
world wars; yet its very bigness has brought with it "Damage Control"
problems of major proportion. Plant areas of a million or more square
feet no longer are uncommon. Tank farms, warehouses and factories that
stretch for thousands of feet are to be found in nearly every state
„
It is axiomatic that the bigger the pile of fuel, the bigger the fire
Many industrial olants today represent enormous piles of flammable and
explosive material subject to what is called exposure to a single fire.
Along with increases in the size of plants have come increases in
areas within plants that are without subdivision by fire walls, fire
curtains, or other forms of protection. In many modem industrial
plants it is possible for a fire to rage 800 to 1000 feet through $
building without encountering any obstacles to its progress • Some are
so huge that the municipal fire department can reach only a small area
of the plant with its hose streams^, In many cases the fire may actually
burn itself out before the firemen can approach its center*
Another hazard is the practice of building windowless plants It

is virtually impossible for firemen to get at the fire in such
structures, and often they provide a screen behind which the fire
may burn uncontrolled for hours.
In seeking to gain the benefit of lower tax assessment values,
additional lend space to allow for plant expansion, easier accessibility
for employees, etc., there is a definite tendency to locate plants in
the proximity of cities rather than within their corporate limits
•
But in so doing, companies are acquiring these benefits in exchange
for the advantages of ful'y-manned municipal fire departments , high
pressure water supply systems, enlightened building codes, and bene-
ficial fire prevention ordinances that reduce industrial hazardso The
dangers that accompany the trend to the country should not be over-
looked. The fire department in a small town or rural area may not
have the men, equipment, or the "know-how" to control fires in hu^e
factories or warehouse buildings. The fire department may be located
miles from the plant, and the fire that breaks out could burn for hours
before effective fighting forces could be brought to bear upon ito
Never before have so many materials of extreme combustibility
been used, stored, or transported on such a grand scale as in the
United States today. Tank cars, tank trucks, ships barges, end
pipelines convey a wealth of raw materials on which our whole chemi-
cal, plastics, rubber, synthetic textile, and many other industries
2
Lawrence L. Bethel, Franklin S. Atwater, George Ho Bo Smith,
Harvey A. Stackman, Jr., Industrial Organization and Management
(New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1950), p. 19&°

ere based. Many of these materials are gases—almost as toxic as war
gases* Some are liquids at low temperatures that become gases at
atmospheric temperatures and are more easily ignited than gasoline.
Some are stored under extremely high pressures Many are stored in
enormous quantities.
BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM APPLICATION OF NAVAL DAMAGE CONTROL
PRINCIPLES
What can industry do to offset these potential hazards? It is
admittedly not practical to train every employee to be a fireman—but
neither is it practical to abandon the industrial "ship** in the face
of impending or actual disaster without taking steps that will mini-
mize damage; nor is it practical to stand by awaiting the arrival of
professionals when there is already available a group that with proper
training and organization can transform itself into effective Damage
Control teams—the employees themselves.
The potential savings to be realized from this approach of
applying ship-board Damage Control techniques to industry go well
beyond the avoided losses in property which, according to the National
Bureau of Fire Underwriters, were 2Mb million dollars in 1962 for fire
alore ! Indeed, there are other considerations such as the loss of
trained and skilled workers who obtain employment elsewhere after a
3Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 5?»
No. 2, October 1963 (Boston: I963).
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full or partial plant shutdown, the los:- of customers who cannot wait
for an industry to get back into productions the loss of executive man-
power in scheduling, rebuilding, and planning, the loss of competitive
position; the list is seemingly endless—

CHAPTER II
A MODEL DISASTER CONTROL PUN FOR INDUSTRY
Chapter I dealt with Damage Control techniques and organizations
aboard U.S. Naval Vessels today. It was also hypothesized in Chaoter
I that American industry has similar needs for the same type of
functional organization, i.e., one that assigns specific responsi-
bilities to individual members of the organization, to cope with those
emergencies, which if left uncontrolled long enough, could develop
into a major disaster.
It is the purpose of this Chapter to present a model industrial
disaster control plan which, in essence, was developed from those
techniques heretofore applied primarily by shipboard Damage Control
organizations. Various details as to how the plan was developed,
implemented, and operated, as well as the results will also be
presented. Later Chapters will deal specifically with cost ef-
fectiveness studies concerning the involved expenditures*
The model to be presented was developed specifically for the
Navy^ aircraft Overhaul and Repair Facility located at the U. S*
Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida. The specific Instruction
which promulgated the plan is set forth in Appendix A c
L
NAS JAX )&R Instruction 3^40olA, Subj: Disaster Control Organi-




& R JACKSONVILLE - AN INDUSTRIAL COJ4PLEX
O&R Jacksonville comparability to other industry . As a matter of
showing comparability to other industries in the United States, O&R
Jacksonville occupies about a million square fe<t of building floor
space, employs approximately 3100 civilian workers, overhauls thirteen
different types of aircraft, ten different models of aircraft engines,
and reworks or overhauls over 9000 end items or aircraft component
parts each quarter of the year.
Although the facility has several assembly lines, it is not
primarily an assembly-type plant, but rather a job-shot) organization,
and it is the largest industry in Northeast Florida. The Naval Air
Station, under which the O&R functions as a Department, has its
own fire department of seventeen units which is charged with the
responsibility for providing structural fire protection. The NAS
also has a medical department, a dispensary, and a Naval Hospital
command, all of which are capable of providing emergency medical
services when required.
Within the O&R Department, there is the typical industrial
type of fire protection equipment including fire hoses, C02 bottles,
sprinkler systems, foam systems and magnesium extinguishers. There
are flame-proof areas for testcell operations and several automatic
fire protection systems (CARD0X). In addition, the department has
its own dispensary for civilian employees. There is an industrial
safety division which contributes to make the organization as safety
conscious as any industry in the country.
11

Prior to plan development, there were station and Departmental
fire prevention and fire protection Instructions; there were NAS
hurricane security Rills, Department aircraft hurricane evacuation
Rills, a station storm Bill; there was every type of regulation
required to keep the & R "safely going on in peace or war." What
was truly possessed was many loose ends that needed amalgamation
WHY THE PLAN WAS DEVELOPED
A Directive from higher authority . As a direct result of the
Cuban Crisis of 1962, the Commandant, Sixth Naval District, by re-
vision to previous Instructions, directed NAS Jacksonville to organize,
train and equip a minimum number of disaster control teams that would
be considered a part of the North Florida Disaster Control Group.
*
This, in effect, required that the Naval Air Station ••military"
facilities for fire fighting, damage control, medical aid and de-
contamination be integrated and then redistributed organizationally
as "Disaster Control Recovery Teams." The & R Department, however,
was still the largest facility at the station involving the employment
of some 3000 workers, none of whom was actively engaged in the civil
defense "disaster control" effort. It became the Department's re-
sponsibility, therefore, to supplement these NAS Jacksonville
Instructions specifically for the & R Department which, in essence,
5
Revision, dated 10 January 1963 to Commandant, Sixth Naval




required that the department "solve its own problems." It was well
known that if there was ever a large explosion or a large incident at
the base, the military forces that the station could muster would be
so limited in numbers as to be ineffective in the & R Department.
& R top management was therefore keenly interested in a coordinated
disaster control effort for the Department*
THE PUN
Preliminary Planning . It was to become a plan of action; to
assess those emergency plans already in existence, evaluate and adapt
their better parts into an all-inclusive plan. Also, the support which
could be expected from outside sources in the event of an incident
would be assessed; and how quickly this support could be made availa-
ble. A rough plan would then be developed and tested prior to issuance
of a final firm plan.
Insections made . To obtain a more practical grasp of existing
conditions concerning the facility itself and worker familiarity with
the facility, a number of inspections were made of the shoos. During
the course of these inspections, a number of startling revelations
were witnessed. For example, a number of industrial gas lines
(Hydrogen, Helium, Butane, Acetylene, Oxygen) ran through some ten
to fifteen shops enroute from storage tanks to the welding shop©
These lines were not coded as to their contents as they passed through
these non-user shops although some of them had isolation valves at
various enroute locations. None of the workers in these non-user
13

shops was aware of what the line contained, nor were they aware that
the spread of volatile gas allowed by a line rupture could be con-
trolled by these valves.
Other facts brought out by the inspections were that no pro-
visions were made for draining and purging volatile solutions from
tanks during conditions of emergency. Workers were not thoroughly
familiar with recent changes that had been incorporated into the
facility, and in general, had an apathetic attitude about civil
defense preparedness. No provisions had been made for "immediate"
needs concerning emergency shutdown, emergency rescue operations and
on-the-scene first aid. It was also determined that the regular
members of the station fire department were not thoroughly con-
versant with some of the inherent dangers associated with some of
the more complex equipment within the department.
The Damage Control Survey . As a result of the information
obtained in the preliminary inspections, the task of locating and
identifying every piece or item of equipment/fixture that could
contribute to damage was assigned to the Plant Division Superintendent
•
The criteria -under which he was to proceed was: Could the item, if
left uncontrolled, unattended, or unsecured in an emergency, con-
tribute to, or become a further source of damage during an emergency.
Each shop and work area was surveyed piecemeal, identifying each
item which met the aforementioned criteria • In most cases, every shop
supervisor knew what the described items were supposed to do. However,
some of the systems, such as the industrial gases system, which ran
14

throughout the facility were more nebulous except in the shop where
they were used. Although assigned specifically to the Plant Super-
intendent, the Damage Control survey was a joint effort which included
the services of the various shops, division superintendents and shop
supervisors. This survey required two months to complete and con-
tained sixty-four pages of material, one page of which is reproduced
in Figure 1. From this particular page of the survey, it may be noted
that each of the items represented has some degree of volatility, and
if left unattended in an emergency, could be the source of further
damage or injury. The shops cited in Figure 1 are all in the same
building and general proximity of one anothero
Objectives Stated : During the time that the Damage Control survey
was being conducted, various members of & R management were assigned
the task of developing suitable objectives,, After due consideration
of the present organization of the Department and the experience of
several members of management in shipboard Damage Control organizations,
the following objectives were stated and subsequently accepted by top
management:
1. Find a method to adequately portray the & R as it now is,
indicating as well as possible those items of equipment which need
attention in case of emergency.
6
Consult Bureau of Naval Weapons STANDARD ORGANIZATION MANUAL
FOR OVERHAUL AND REPAIR ACTIVITIES, Navy Department (Washington: U«S,
Government Printing Office, Rev. 1963).
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7« Kxhaust system control switch on east wall of shop 6214
«
Shot) 6281-1 (Shop 6252 area) :
1. Caustic soda tank. Capacity 40 gallons at 180 degrees F. Steam
valve on tank. No drain connected.
2. Sodium cyanide tank. Capacity JO gallons* No drain connected
3. Sodium cyanide tank. Capacity 3^ gallons No drain connected.
k» Bronze plating tank. Capacity b0 gallons of cyanide base solution
at ICO degrees F. Steam valve on tank. No drain connected
•
Shop 6261 (6103 area) :
1. Metal spray booth. Four oxygen and seven acetylene bottles used.
Also, acetylene and oxygen are piped in from distribution system.
Exhaust blower switch on wall near booth.
Shop 62 ol (Etching Room) :
1. Two carboys of nitric acid and 400-pound drum of caustic soda in
are?
.
2. Room exhaust fan in overhead. Control switch number 11 in power
panel number 40 on north wall of shop 6203.
Shop 6281-1:
1. Baking oven. Exhaust fan switch on side of oven.
2. Tin-cadmium plating machine. Exhaust blower control switch on
east wall.
a. Tank number 2, approximately 250 gallons of caustic soda at
1<C degrees F. Steam valve on tank. No drain connectedo
b. Tank number 4, approximately 100 gallons of hydrochloric acid.
No drain connected.
c. Tank 'lumber 6, approximately 1400 gallons of tin stannate at
175 degrees F. Steam valve on tank. No drain connected.
FIGURE 1
A TYPICAL PAGE FROM THE DAMAGE CONTROL SURVEY CONDUCTED BY
THE PUNT DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT (PUNT SURVEY I962)
16

d. Tank number 8, approximately 300 gallons of sodium cyanide.
No drain connected.
e. Tank number 10, approximately 150 gallons of water at 160
degrees F. No drain connected.
3. Bond eri zing tank, approximately kO gallons of nitric and phosphoric




?. Find a way to assign these items of equipment to the indi-
vidual workers who could control them,
3. Build an organization for disaster control which will
resemble as closely as possible the present & R departmental organi-
zation.
k. Combine the active portions of Damage Control x-dth the
passive portions, and have measures for emergency rescue.
The Disaster Control Drawing . It was decided, that the best way to dis-
play the information developed by the survey was to design a drawing
which would be representative of a particular area, and be no larger
than one could easily comprehend in terms of its usefulness for
training. A three-dimensional oblique drawing was conceived whereby
both profile and plan representation could be made of the items cited.
Figure 2 is a small scale reproduction of one of these drawings (a
complete set of drawings covering the entire Department contained
eleven prints) the boundaries of which corresponded to the then ex-
isting "fire-zone boundaries." After careful consideration of the
first objective earlier stated, it was decided that the following in-
formation should be placed on all drawings: Zone boundaries, shop lay-
outs, the location of all fire-fighting equipment within and adjacent
to the zone, the location of all first-aid lockers and equirxuent,
hurricane gear lockers, Damage Control gear lockers, and the location
of all items requiring attention in the event of fire, explosion, floe d
or other emergency. Careful analysis of Figure 2 should immediately
18

Disaster Control (Oblique) Drawing, O&R JAX, Zone 346

indicate the wealth of information which could be mode easily availa-
ble to the workers for the purpose of training alone. Further analysis
of Figure 2 will reveal the coding system developed to portray and
identify functions of the various items of equipment.
Noting the right hand side of Figure 2, the first indicator, Roman
numeral I, refers to the area. The second indicator, a letter, refers
to the zone. In this case, the letter MEM refers to Zone 346. The
third indicator is a letter which refers to the type of equipment, the
letter MT" stands for tank, "E" for electrical equipment, "V" for valve,
"DH for door, etc. (Code contained in the Appendix.) The last indicator
refers to a sequence number that the item acquired as it was located
on the drawing. (It was further found advantageous to go to the piece
of equipment in the shop and place the same code on the item.)
' Figure 3 is an actual photograph of several items of equipment
labeled according to the Plan requirements. Two distinct categories
of equipment can be seen in this figure; the electrical panels are
marked with the characteristic yellow triangle and black letters of
Civil Defense. Also, an item used for emergency rescue operations
(extreme right) can be seen bearing the Damage Control item code.
Span of Control and The Area Disaster Control Group . It was also
considered desirable that a specific area size be established within
which an organization could be formed that would be completely autono-
mous groups which could function independently. Tie two areas (Figure 4)








DISASTER CONTROL AREAS (with zoning)
NOTE: Areas 121, 315, and 832 are not included as part of the Disaster
Control Organisation. However, these areas will be manned by OSA personnelin case of fire. Personnel manning these sones will report to other
departments for coordination in accordance, with NASJAXINST 11320.1C.
22

.roi. Groups required for the plan to function satisfactorily*
Simply then, each of the two areas is controlled by an Area Disaster
Control Coordinator, and assisting him are people responsible for each
of the zones -within a particular area. The large numbers 346, 341,
34?, and so forth, were the various existing fire zones in the & R
at the time the new Disaster Control Plan was drawn. These were not
changed. The zone drawing (Figure ?.) is actually Zone 346 on the Area
Plan (Figure 4).
The people in charge of zones are designated Zone Fire and Hurri-
cane Marshals. Within each zone, there are the various shop supervisors
who will be responsible to the Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal, and
within each shop, there will be fire fighting teams and Damage Control
teams responsible to the supervisor • This sets forth the basic concept
involving span of control entailed within the Plan.
The Zone Team organization . Although the entire departmental
organization can be found in Appendix A, it will be relevant at this
point to look closely at some of the organizational relationships,
considering the functions performed.
Figure 5 is a caricature representation of the Zone Team Organi-
zation (Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal and below) . Looking first at
the center of the Figure, one will notice the shop supervisor, and the
indication of his control over elements of his shop fire bill (Figure 6)
and shop Damage Control bill (Figure 7) u The shop fire bill is a docu-
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>cent. to the shop, including a necessary amount of overlap to allow
for all. contingencies. The bill also indicates the names of persons
responsible for handling this equipment. Furthermore » it reflects
assignments for all working shifts and included alternates
.
The Damage Control bill (indicated by figures on the right side of
Figure
.5) is broken into two parts; one part pertains to the security
of equipment, the other part involves the rescue of personnel as one
example of active Damage Control pr?ctice«
The Damage Control bill and the fire bill (collectively known as
disaster control bills) are the lowest level of responsibility assignment.,
The bills indicate the individual workers in the shops by name, the item
for which they are responsible, and under what conditions of alarm they
will take certain action. The Damage control bills also contain items
of equipment which are not in the specific shop, but which can be of
assistance in event of emergency. For example: The Hydrogen line valve
which can be operated from a remote location if necessary.
Departmental Orgrani zation . Figure i is similar to Figure 5»
exceot that it represents the Disaster Control organization above the
level of the zone.
Recalling from Figure 4 that there are eleven zones in the & R
complex under two major area, divisions, one finds a similar notation
at the bottom of Figure 8; five zones in Area I and six zones in Area II.
?he Area Coordinators who report directly to the departmental Disaster
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port teams: 1) a Communication and Traffic Team, 2) a Firs -
ei
, and 3) an Emergency Rescue Team, Each .'re? Coordinator % along
with his +hree support teams and his five (or six) Zone Fire and Hurri-
cane .arshals vdth their respective zone team organizations is considered
to be a completely autonomous Area Disaster Control Group for his re-
spective area.
There ~re several other functional elements of imnortance in
Figure 8. "here \&s a possible need foreseen for a. Decontamination
Team in the event of nuclear attack or nuclear incident (a radiation
hazard caused through the handling of nuclear weapons). The Decontami-
nation Team was staffed by military personnel assigned to the & R
Department* They received their training outside of the Department and
also fulfilled other requirements of the basic NAS Instruction for
disaster control as a station Decontamination Team,, This small group
of people could perform any monitoring necessary in either of the two
areas in the event of a radiation hazard. (It is recognized that many
industrial organizations would not feel it worthwhile to consider this
particular aspect of disaster control unless located in a prime target
area. Cn the other hand, some education of workers in decontamination
procedures is of considerable assistance in combating fatalistic atti-
tudes about the ability to survive and fight back in the event of nuclear
attack.
)
The small group of people referred to as "Disaster Control Team 80M
(Figure 8) is composed of those plant services personnel normally employed
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during non-operating hours. These people were given the necessary
training required bo assume the disaster control function on ••? limited
scale during non-working hours.
Top Management control and, pl anning * The Assistant Department Head
was appointed as the departmental Disaster Control Officer with the
Production Manager as his alternate*' The five staff assistants were
appointed from those officers who had regular billets most closely as-
sociated with the responsibilities assigned by the Plan. For example*
the departmental Fire and Hurricane Marshal was the Shoos Division
Officer; his alternate was the Shoos Group Superintendent, The First-
Aid Assistant was the departmental Administrative Officer* and his alter-
nate was the Administrative Group Superintendent o The Damage Control
Assistant was the Production Engineering Officer; his alternate, the
Production Engineering Superintendent* The Communications and Traffic
Assistant was the Production Planning Officer, and his assistant was the
Dispatch Division Superintendent. Although the Aircraft Transfer Officer
was not in the hierarchy from which the other Staff Assistants were drawn,
he w?s the Division Officer for the military enlisted personnel of the
Department,, and therefore appointed as the & R Decontamination As-
sistant. In every way possible, the existing organization of the
Department was preserved in organizing for Disaster Control.,
7





Responsibilities assigned * Responsibilities specifically assig
to all members who were a part of the Disaster Control organization con-
cerning organizing, training, and functional control may be found in
Appendix A.
Organization boards * One of the principal problems encountered
during development of the Plan vras determining how best to display in-
formation and provide a vehicle for individual workers to keep themselves
informed about their specific responsibilities To do this, a number of
"Organization Boards" were designed and constructed, later to be located
in strategic areas and zones throughout the Industrial Complex. Figure 9
is a photograph of one of the Boards (located in Zone 227 of Area I) e
One of these boards is required in each zone and at each Area Mobilization
Point; on them appear the names of all key team leaders in that particular
zone. There are also places for the disassembled basic instruction
(Appendix A) to be attached for quick reference. Prominent placement
and ready access has improved their usefulness as training devices. A
Disaster Control drawing (like Figure ?) is located in a frame adjacent
to each organization board so that it also can be used for training
purooses.
Implementation and shift-over to the new system . After prelimi-
nary olans were formulated concerning the basic organization, znd after
construction of the first Disaster Control drawing, a period of training
(about six weeks) took place, during which time every worker with an as-
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his function. The Fire ?nd Damage Control Team Leaders, along with
the Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal of this one zone and his respective
Area Coordinator also underwent systematic and organized training. The
Support teams for this one area were equipped and drilled as to their
functions and responsibilities in relation to this one zone. After all
training was completed, an administrative-operational inspection was
carried out (Inspection Form appears as Enclosure 7 to Appendix A.).
After the inspection and drills were completed, several members of
management (Staff Assistants, Disaster Control Officer, Area Coordinator,
the r»?rticular Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal ) all met and critiqued
the drill. \-Ihen it was determined that the zone was properly prepared.
for the responsibilities involved, it was brought under the new system.
Furthermore, the basic Instruction was not published until the plan had
been imr>lemented in one zone (JM-6).
IMPLEMENTING AND OPERATING COSTS
Im-olementinp' costs . Table I represents a cost breakdown of those
9items required to implement the Plan at & R Jacksonville. Although
so^e costs are estimates, they represent reasonable cost conclusions
based on man-hours away from the normal course of work* A twenty
percent overlap contingency was deducted from total costs to allow for
9
Cost information obtained from Plant Engineering records of 1963




& R JACKSONVILLE DISASTER CONTROL
ITEM COST INFORMATION
Planning and Service Costs are estimates based on stated criteria <>
Construction and equipment costs were as charged to the Job Number
(MAINT JOB COST ALLOTMENT # 0033485, & R, I963).
Planning:*
Top Management:
(includes time spent at five meetings by-
ten members of & R Management, average
grade GS-12) $ 300.00
Departmental:
(includes time spent over six weeks period
one half-hour per day, 150 persons through-
out eleven Zones @$2.00/hour)
Drafting Service:
(One Draftsman, full-time) (twenty weeks)
Plant Construction:
20 Damage Control Gear Lockers $200
17 Hurricane Gear Lockers 170
15 Organization Boards 75
?3 Frames (for DC Drawings) 115







Damage Control Support Equipment 1000
Hurricane Securing Equipment 750
First-Aid Equipment 1500
Training:
(Estimated at 1000 hours on the job,
prior to first drill)
First Drill:
(Charged as time off the job, eleven












LESS: °0;3 overlap contingency for equipment items
end training which would be required under
any other plan under present use. 2^28.00
TOTAL EFFECTIVE COST TO IMPLEMENT $11,716.00
* 20$ of Planning Cost are considered adaptation cost, the remaining
80£> of Cost refer to Model Development.
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vhose costs -which would have accrued in any event* For exanple, hurri-
cane security costs would have continued regardless of whether or not the
Plan was put into effect; fire drills would have been held regardless of
what other plans may have been developed. Plant construction and e-
quipment costs were actual costs attributed directly to planning for
Disaster Control. It may therefore be concluded from the information
shown in Table I that the costs to implement the Disaster Control Plan
for eleven zones at & R Jacksonville was slightly more than $11,000.
Operating costs . Assuming total implementation of the Plan,
operating costs would be based on the following: Periodic drills,
periodic replacement of equi-pment, periodic retraining of workers and
maintenance of condition readiness. Owing to the newness of the Plan,
and the fact that no operating costs other than drills had been gener-
ated, it was decided to place operating costs at five percent of imple-
menting cost each month until major cost items dictated otherwise; thus,
monthly operating costs were placed at less than $500,
Reduction of o^eratinp costs as a direct result of the Plan . One
day during the development of the overall Plan, there was an automatic
fire alarm activated in Zone 3^6» the sounding of trhich caused approxi-
mately 600 workers to evacuate the zone after closing certain windows a
(This was prescribed procedure at that time.) The fire department
answered the call and spent well over an hour determining that this
alarm had been false. A number of critical sources had to be investi-
gated as possible cause for the alarm. When the "all clear" was
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sounded, the cost of this false alann to the Department in terms of
productive hours, was assessed at $25,0^0 in direct labor alon^o s a
result of this particular incident, those involved in the departmental
planning posed the question: "If a shop supervisor had a fire in his
shop, would he not certainly know it? Iiihy then could not the shop
supervisor be responsible for actually securing his particular shop and
notifying the Zone Organization Point? Conversely, if a fire alarm was
sounded, and there was no indication of ? fire, assuming no further word
was received from outside sources, why not allow the shop to continue
work"? Eased on this reasoning, the shot) supervisor was granted the
authority (see Fage 9, Appendix A) to control his own men based on his
judgment and estimate of the situation at hand- The granting of this
authority means in effect: >Jhen an alarm is sounded, personnel assigned
to the zone in question will man their fire stations.. Everyone else in
the zone will become alert., but will remain at their jobs unless directed
otherwise by the shoo suoervisor or higher authority* (A review of records
indicated that 2.5 alarms oer month, automatic or otherwise, were sounded
within the deoartment. Of this average, ? /month were assessed as false;
the remainder, or 1 every 2 months represented genuine fires of varying
magnitudes of severity. Although ? alarms per month were assessed as
false, they required that great numbers of workers leave their work for
periods of time varying from 5 minutes to more than 1 hour. As a result
of the new procedure of allowing the shor> supervisor to secure his shop,
rather than having it happen "automatically," the resulting -oer month
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c( I by k< >ping workers on the job through 'hose false •
assessed at .':;000/month.) Heedless to say, this method of oper
has aid for itself many times through the savings ac<rued when alarms
occur. Other sources of savings will be pointed out in the next section.
rPDRATIMG HE5UL": S
C & R Top Management reviews one year of operation under the Flan
.
The Flan, as described, was implemented in the first of eleven : in
January, 19^3 • Fy Kay of that same yerr, all eleven zones of the & R
Complex were functioning under the Plan. As a result of inquiries con-
cerning the operation of the Plan, the Overhaul and Repair Officer in
December, 196°>, provided the following:
There has been an improvement in worker morale and acceptance
that is difficult to measure in concrete terms. Perhaps, it
is an unconscious recognition that they can do something to
protect their jobs as well as a feeling of greater personal
security in the performance of their work. Since imple-
mentation of the program, our lost time accidents rate hrs
been reduced from 719 last year to 16 man-days for the sa 3
period this year. I recognize that these figures could also
be attributed to our safety program; however, the latter pro-
gram was conducted at approximately the same level of effort
during the two periods.
There has accrued .some indirect benefit through local pub-
licity in the newspapers and recognition of & R trained
employees who took the proper emergency actions when present
at automobile accidents outside of normal working hours.
10
R. K. Fagan, personal letter to Frederick G. Fryberger, Plant
Engineer, Chemicals and Plastics Division, EMC Corporation, Baltimore.
Maryland, 17 December 1963* (Permission contained within to quote*)
?8

Two unscheduled events have occurred in the past few months
that provide an inkling to the effectiveness of the program.
In one case, a building contractor employee during the modi-
fication of an engine test cell, erroneously cut through a
70 psi. oxygen supply line (after the proper inert Pipe line
had been pointed out to him and marked) with sn acetylene
torch. The resulting explosion ruptured an adjacent hydrogen
line, and we had a fire of major proportions in the making.
The contractor employee was burned and injured when knocked
from the scaffolding by the explosion. The Local Disaster
Control Team x^ent into immediate action by securing the
industrial gas lines in the area, dumping the pressure in
the lines and bringing the fire under control prior to the
arrival of the fire department vehicles which are located
approximately three blocks away. In the meantime, the area
first-aid team went into action with the injured contractor
employee and had him on a stretcher on the way to the dis-
pensary by the time the ambulance arrived with the fire
trucks. Damage and injury were minimized by the training
and prompt action of the employees involved.
The second unscheduled event occurred when Hurricane Flora
took up a course for Jacksonville on October l^th, and we
were directed to button up our activity and hangar all air-
craft. The last time the Jacksonville area had been
threatened by a hurricane had required about five to six
hours to secure the & R. This time we were able to secure
all areas in two hours that evening (and incidentally, we
were in full operation within one hour after the threat of
the hurricane was over the next morning). The minimization
of our shut-down time in this cas« was definitely attribu-
table to the planning and training resulting from our
Disaster Control organization.
Both of the above events have provided emphasis and con-
fidence in our Plan and an assurance that the cost and
effort of implementation is justified in our environment.
Results of drills conducted . As a result of regularly scheduled
drills, the following items were noted: l) Need for further training
and indoctrination of employee duties and actions in emergency areas.






during the confusion which results. 3) Need for assistants to helm
fireiren with hose-laying. 4) Clearing access routes and aisles of
carts, dollies, tractor trains, and forklifts. 5) First-aid teams
in all cases have performed perfectly, providing the correct actions
and procedures yell in advance of arrival of station ambulance.
This Chapter has presented a model Disaster Control Plan which
was developed from those techniques heretofore applied primarily to
shipboard Damage Control organizations. The specific plan was developed
for the Navy's aircraft Overhaul ^ncl Repair Facility located at the
U. 3. Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida, wo appears in this
paper as Appendix A. There was a comparison drawn between & R
Jacksonville and other industries in the United States. The reasons
for development were also -pointed out. The Flan itself was then pre-
sented indicating the planning required, inspections made, and the
Damage Control survey conducted to establish a beginning r>oint from which
to operate, iiixamples of the survey items are noted in Figure 1. Ob-
jectives of the Plan were then set forth, 'long with specific items
required by the Plan, such as the "key" tool of the Plan, the Disaster
Control drawing* The organization required by the Plan was then ex-
plained including the manner in which the organization was staffed so
as to take advantage of the existing & R organization. The method
of shift-over from the old method of handling emergencies to the new

was then described. Implementing and operating costs were discussed
(Table I) as well as necessary assumptions.
A specific example of operating costs being reduced as a direct
result of the Plan was offered, indicating that similar savings could be
obtained in any comparable industry. The fin?l section dealt with the
results obtained so far in approximately one year of operation.
The Chapters to follow will deal with the idea of applying similar
olans to other industries, and to show not only ootential benefit from




A COMPARABLE PLAN FOR AMERICAS INDUSTRY?
CONSIDERATION OF EFFECT UPON INSURANCE RATES
It -will be recalled from Chanter I that a partial answer to the
question as to whether or not Naval Damage Control principles have any
value in application to American industry was provided through con-
sideration of certain significant trends in industry itself; principal
among which were increased olant size, industry migration to less
denselj populated (and correspondingly less well-protected) areas, and
increased use of volatile raw materials.
Statistical evidence to support this thesis of applicability will
be presented in the following Chapter; it is considered appropriate at
this point to present a non-statistical consensus of the thesis, and
more specifically, the model plan discussed in Chapter II by experienced
raters of insurance risks.
Inasmuch as the dollar loss from fires occurring annually in this
TO
country is in a marked upward trend, it was considered that an inte-
grated working plan of disaster control designed to minimize the
"domino effect" in the spread of a disaster from the point of incidence
1?
'Report of the Committee on Statistics and Origin of Losses,




would have a favorable effect ur.on the fire insurance risk grading
-process of those companies adopting the model to their own use. In
order to verify the correctness of this belief, the writers met in San
Francisco with representatives of three organizations directly involved
in fire risk grading or insurance underwriting: The National Board of
Fire Underwriters, the Pacific Fire Underwriters 1 Bureau, and the
Factory Insurance Association.
NATIONAL BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS AMD FIRS INSPECTION AND RATING
BUREAU RATING PROCEDURES
The National Board of Fire Underwriters is an organization
maintained end supported by some two hundred stock fire insurance
companies that provides technical engineering, research, and sta-
tistical- coordination to local Fire Inspection and Rating Bureaus.
The local Bureaus are similarly maintained by fire underwriters, and
they are licensed as a service organization by the states in which they
operate.
T/Jhereas the NBFU rates public fire protection services within a
geographical area (response time for the local Fire Department, location
of fire hydrants, traffic congestion, etc.), the local FIRB provides en
independent and unbiased appraisal of insurable plants, and grades these
industries as tc degree of fire risk. They also establish schedules for
the use and guidance of fire underwriters to determine independently the
degree of risk involved in writing any particular policy of insurance.
National Board Protection Graces . National Board -protection grades;
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run from NB 10 (no protection) in reverre numerical order to NB 1 (best
protection). Well trained and fully equipped city Fire Departments such
.'i? exist in San Francisco allow the ratings for areas within the city
limits to be set at or near NB ?.. Protection grades for individual
plants located within the geographical boundaries to which the favorable
NB grade applies are reflected in the insurance rates aoolicable to that
industry.
Rating Bureau Criteria . . However, it should be noted that the
MB area rating serves only as a starting point for individual plant
rate determination. Independent fire underwriters can avail themselves
cither of the professional services of the FIRB in a principal-agent
relationship or of the FIRB rating guide lines to determine facility
deficiencies which would increase the degree of risk, thereby in-
creasing the insurance rates. This method of grading allies when the
comoany is totally dependent upon public protection, in which case the
i
najor categories of deficiency are lack of goor1 housekeeping within the
boundaries of the plant, and the nature of bordering hazards.
The rating bureaus also establish schedules for grading a risk
4
which provides its ovm private protection or utilises a combination of
orivate and public protection. In this arrangement, grading is es-
tablished in NB terns, but complete analysis of the plant is made with
regard to the following factors:^3
13
Schedule for Grading Prote ct ion Facilities , Pacific Fire Rating
Bureau (S^n Francisco: Pacific Firt Rating Bureau, 1963).

A. Water System
1. Adequacy of water sullies and distribution sys







3. General Organization *nd Eouipment
C. Fire Alarm Systems
1. General - Test, Maintenance, Location and Generators
2 • Equipment
D. Divergence - Penalty charges are determined by the "spread"
existing between the Charges for A. (Water System) and the
sura of the ooints charges for B. (Fire Departments) and C.
(Fire .Alarm Systems).
E. Structural






1. Housekeeping and use or storage of hazardous material
°. Welding practices
Deficiency ooints determined against the above factors in accordance with
the rating bureau schedule are convertible to NB protection grades. These
grades are then used, in the same manner as those derived for facilities
completely deoendent on oublic fire protection for the determination of
insurance rates.
APPRAISAL OF THE PUN 3Y N3FU. PFUB. AMD FIA REPRESENTATIVES . The
model plan of Chanter II was presented to these organizations along with
a request for a frank appraisal of the potential value to any single




Lng process just discussed, do Naval Parnate Control principles have
*n.y application to -American industry?
The question} n°t unlike many others that continually confront
orican industry, cannot be ansxiered with a categorical and universal
"ye?" or "no." Rather, the answer must be conditioned by the unique
environment of each company considering adoption.
HotTever, the consensus is that there are at least three oossible
results stemming from differing industrial circumstances
s
A. Organizations whose facilities were located within the geo-
graphical boundaries of cities that were rated by the National Board
of Fire Underwriters with a favorable rating such as KB 2 or NB 3 would
oerive a very rrdnimum to no reduction whatever in fire insurance rates.
For example, ? company with a factory or warehouse located in San
Francisco (1IB 2) would derive no more "credits" from the disaster
control plan than it could from simply exhibiting good-housekeeping
within the facility. In any case, its rating could not be computer
lore favorably than the city in which it was located.
B. In the event that the company was located within the
boundaries of a city that had an unfavorable NB rating, such as KB 7
or NB 8, incorporation of the plan could contribute greatly toward
achieving a one or two point reduction.
C. Where companies are located in rural or remote areas that
lack adequate fire fighting forces 9nd equipment, it is incumbent
on management to provide their own protection. It has been tire
<4o

general observation of 5a_n Francisco area raters that most responsible
managements have required at least minimum amounts of nrivate oro-
tection in the form of equipment and organization*
Nonetheless, the raters observed that benefits to American
industry by widespread plan implementation could be realized—if not
by immediate reductions in insurance rates made nossible by organizing
?nd training beforehand for disaster, then certainly by improvement of
the loss rate as a result of fire which in turn would be reflected in
a reduction of rates. Of special concern to the NBFU rating personnel
is their observation that the indirect losses not directly ascribable
to a disaster (loss of orders, loss of skilled personnel who seek
employment elsewhere, firm competitive position x-dthin an industry, etc s )
Ik
will run on an average five times the actual cost of fire damage itself.
Development of a Survey . Encouraged by this qualified, yet favorable
expression of opinion, and the low installation and operating costs of
the model plan at & R Jacksonville, the writers next developed a
questionnaire for completion and return by a randomly selected number
of companies.
The objectives of the survey were to:
1. Ascertain the degree to which the surveyed eomoanies had.
organized their employees into disaster control teams along the lines
Ik
Interview with Office Manager, Pacific Fire Rpting Bureau, San
Francisco, California on ?? December 196?,
k?

of the & R Jacksonville model plan. It was anticipated that the
responses would support the contention that although American industry
spends considerable amounts of money for fire protection, first-aid
facilities, special fireproof structures, and industrial safety devices,
there is, in general, lacking a program which ore-assigns specific
responsibilities to employees within the limits of their capabilities
which could reduce significantly the extent of damage once an emergency
situation occurred. Furthermore, that the worker with the greatest
knowledge of ho^J to handle an emergency situation becomes a completely
nassive spectator because there is no plan to draw upon his superior
knowledge in controlling damage.
2. Ascertain the physical similarities of the surveyed company
Lo a H Jacksonville before implementation of the plan insofar as
size, investment, number of employees, availability of fire equipment,
and existent safety programs were concerned. Here the intention was to
acquire data that would support the belief that many companies are
presently organized and equipped so as to facilitate an easy transition
to the organizational concepts of the model plan. In other words, there
is already on hand the fire and safety equipment, the personnel, and the
line organization for development of an effective disaster control
program; the lack involves the existence of an overall scheme to tie
these loose ends together.
Fursuant to these objectives, a series of questions (refer to
Appendix B) designed to produce the desired data was assembled into a

questionnaire. For example, Question ~, Size of Cprm; ny, contains
series of sub-questions, which if answered completely, provide suf-
ficient data to establish the Physical size of the responding company,
and to rank it with respect to other companies, and to & R Jacksonville,
Answers to Question 5» Georgranhical Location , and Question 7»
External Services , provide data to establish the extent of public
protection and available outside assistance upon occurrence of a
disaster.
Question 6, Safety Proprams , was intended to determine the extent
of organization among the sampled companies that included:
A. the conventional programs of safety and fire prevention
B. a disaster control program
C. employee narticipation in organized urograms
D. first-aid, medical, and fire protection facilities.
An additional purpose of this question was to provide data by which
management attitudes toward the various programs might be ascertained.
Question 8, Statistics, was provided to give the respondents "n
o-mortunity to elaborate on any significant trends in the areas of
industrial safety and fire prevention within their own organizations
that ihey considered to be attributable to programs in being.
rdstribution of the Survey . The selection of companies to receive
the questionnaire is a process best described as s "practical-random"
approach. I\hile there was conscious effort made to ensure distribution
• hrough a wide cross section of industries, there was no attempt bo
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insert bias in the selection of a company within the industry. Nor
were any constraints of company size imposed upon the selection process,
"he need for the management of the fifty employee machine job-shop to
organize their operation so as to minimize damage to facilities and/or
injuries to personnel is considered to be of equal relative imnortance
as compared to a similar need of the fifty thousand employee industrial
complex.
The actual distribution was accomplished for fifty questionnaires
via a Plant Engineering and Maintenance Conference convened at
Cleveland in January 1964. The remaining 150 questionnaires were
forwarded through the mails during the same period.
Chapter III has centered around developing a method to determine
whether or not an application of Naval Damage Control principles of
organization can be of significant value in reducing operating costs
for /onerican industry. An expression of reaction of fire rating bureau
representatives upon presentation of the model plan was sought, and the
consensus xrss that while iddesoread adoption would probably not produce
an immediate decline of any size in insurance rates, there would be *n
improvement in the loss rate a? a result of fire with a subsequent
reduction of rates.
The formulation of survey objectives was discussed, followed by
?n examination of the ouestionnaire form with comments on the
SO

expectations regarding responses to it. Finally, explan* ion was made
of the survey company selection nrocess describing the attempt bo cover




ASSESSMENT CF MODEL PUN APPLICABILITY
Thus far, this r^ner has dealt with the development of a model
pl*n for disaster control based upon concepts of employee preparation
and participation. Additionally, it has dealt with the origination
and distribution of a questionnaire to ascertain the degree of similar
industrial organization as well as the types nnn quantities of First-
Aid, medical and fire protection equipment on hand in a representative
cross section of American industry.
In furtherance of the attempt to demonstrate the possibilities
for widespread application of Nav.°l Damage Control techniques to in-
•dustry, it shall be the purpose of this Chapter to:
1) present the compiled results (Tables II-VT) of the survey
(Appendix B) in support of the premises that a), an unnecessarily high
percentage of firms are operating without an overall plan to coordinate
employee efforts to minimize damage in the event of fire, explosion, or
other similar events, and b), that plan implementation would not require
substantial expenditures by individual firms to provide necessary
equipment.
2) develop a cost equation for use in computation of plan imple-
mentation costs within the individual firm for comparison with a\^er?ge
costs of fires to various industries.
3) present a method of approach, involving Simulation techniques
for individual firm assessment of the potential value of plan

Spallation in addition to bhe benefit derived by reduction of •
physical plant losses.
^
vy.-'ilfi' don of Survey Results . From the distribution of two hundred
questionnaires (described in Charter III), ^5 replies were received.
Of this number, ^4 companies forwarded complete or partial information,
while the remaining 11 provided no data, giving various reasons, princi-
pal among •diich were:
1) Security classification of the comr^ny's operations.
2) Unwillingness to disclose "oro^rietary" information.
3) Lack of comoany records from which to obtain the data.
k) Lack of time or staff to assemble requested data. (This was
the reason most frequently given.)
The tyre of industrial operation represented by the >'{• respondent:
roviding data is ~s follows:
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Examination of the following tabulated responses to Question 3 will
assist the reader in classification of the respondent companies °s to
sical size. From ?h., it will be noted that approximately half of
the firms rre larger than & R Jacksonville in terras of working area
(1,000,000 so. ft.) vhile the remaining half are equal in size or
smaller. Further, it can be seen in °d. that & R Jacksonville, with
;100 employees, lies almost exactly midpoint in the range of number of
employees for each responding firm. (As an editorial aside, the writers
hasten to add that the midpoint relative positions of & R Jacksonville
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?6«5$ °* ' •"lo companies are locate* 1 within the corporate limits of
a city (Question 5)» 14«7$ are located outside city limits, and 8.8.
facilities in both areas. Approximately 50$ of the companies indicated
that their geograohical location required snecial consideration for the
occurrence of floods, hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes, end the
accompanying necessity to establish procedures to protect against or
rcinimize losses from these contingencies. However, a determination,
based unon the answers to Question 5b., as to whether the companies who
recognized the existence of a special problem were, in fact, doinp
anything about it was inconclusive. It is suspected that the vague
and generalized wording of the question itself contributed to this
result.
The answers received to Question 6 lend considerable weight, to one
of the two major premises mentioned, earlier, i.e., that many firms are
operating without benefit of a plan to coordinate their activities in
event of emergency. For example, in response to 6a, only ?9»^$ of the
companies reported the existence of a centralized disaster control pro-
gram. An examination of the descriptions for other Safety Frogr^ms
(First-Aid, Industrial Safety, Fire Prevention, etc.) revealed in
varying degrees the duplication of the situation that existed at & R
Jacksonville before May, 19c4-—a number of loose ends in serious need
of being tied together.
9^.1/j reoorted (Question 'c.) that instructions and procedures
;'x-f} promulgated for the programs that are condricted. The same
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percentage reported (Question 6d.) that drills and other instructions]
programs are being conducted;, however, there was a vide range of
emphasis indicated by the frequency (6d.(l)) and degree of realism
(6d.(2)) provided in the practice.
Frequency of Drills % of Companies
1 hour/month ^8.?^
1 hour/quarter 14.7$
Semiannually 8 . 8$
Occasionally 14.7#*
No answered 2?. 6$
100.1$
* Includes those companies that schedule drills less frequently
than Semiannually and/or those companies whose answers indicated
lack of any schedule.
Simulation of Drills cl of Companies





* Two categories of "Simulated." are used to differentiate between two
categories of affirmative response to Question 6d.(?). Simulated
(supported) contained, in addition to an affirmative answer to the
question, supporting material indicating considerable detail planning
to rrovide realism during drills.
The answers received to Questions of. and 6g. would arc^ear to bear
out the second, of the two major oremises: Flan implementation would not
require large expenditures by incividu?! firms to provide necessary
additional equipment for the use of disaster control teams. The
majority of the respondent companies, znd by extension, American
industry in general, already have on hand substantial First-Aid, Medical,





6f . Extent of First Aid, Kedical Facilities
Ho Provisions
Fir at /del Chests or Lockers
Dispensaries end 2
Nurse(s) on Duty, 2 and 3
Doctors on Duty, ?, 3» 3nd 4
3, 4, and 5
2.9$
11.8$
11.8$ (available at least one shift)




6g. Fire Protection Soulpnent Available
C0_or Chemical Extinguishers 2.9$'
Sprinkler System and 1
Fire Hose Reels, 1 and 2
Fire Truck(s), 1, 2, and 3
Full time cwmany Fire
Department, 1, 2, 3 and k
1 and 3 only











For Question ?a., community-provided medics1, fire and other
disaster services are available to 9^*1$ of the companies in the
sample. 2.9$ report a lack of such services, 2.9$ have only volunteer
fire service available, and 2.9$ cid not cement
„
While the availability of outside assistance is impressively
high, an analysis of the estimated res irt>nse times given in answer to
Question 7b. tends to dilute the impression* This is particularly
evident irhen the response times are considered against the experience
of a professional fire fighter that the most critical period in an
1 5industrial fire is the first three minutes* "*





Greater th*n 20 minutes 2.<
No comment 11 ?<
100 ol^
15
From an interview with Fire Chief 1. L, Terr-
,
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, on 10 January '.
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Phe response times would suggest a necessarily high degree of reliance
by the individual firm uoon company fire fighting and medical facilities
as opposed to community facilities; but this reliance must be conditioned
by f n assessment of the "saturation level" of the company capability
in this regard.—how serious must the disaster b^ before the plant 1 s
•professional disaster control teams are no longer able to cor>e with it?
A practical solution to the problem is derived through the utilization
of a group that with proper training and organization can transfer itself






































8e. VJith resnect to dollar impact
of the above experience;
8d. Reoort of Significant Los-
Time Occurrence
76.555 had maintained no records
5«9/5 had maintained records or
estimates
5»9$ estimated increasing rate of
experience
11.6% did not answer
100.15&









































T)57EI0PI-;i^'i: OF INITIATION COS';' EQUATION
It can be verified from Table I in Chanter II that initiation of
the model plan at & R Jacksonville cost approximately $11,000. Table
I provides a breakdown of this cost by element.
In order to approximate an initiation cost for organizations whose
size varies from that of the & R, it is considered that the amount of
floor space and the number of employees are two variables that:
1. arc measurable common factors of any industrial organization.
2. are independent factors each being approximately linear for
establishing the number of required disaster control teams,
the amount of equipment, and the extent of construction
necessary for any organization adopting the model.
3. are factors easily employed for an approximation of initiation
cost.
A further consideration of developing an approximation of initiation
costs of the model is that it will include only costs accru'.ng directly
out of olan implementation, i.e., it assumes a re^son^ble availability
of facilities and equipment already on hand as required by conventional
industrial, medical, and fire prevention plans in existence.
It is estimated that 80$ of the cost shown in Table I under the
headings "Tod Management" and "Departmental" were incurred during model
formulation, while the remaining 20^ was anplicable to initiating the
model at the & R; and it would appear not unreasonable to allot ^500
as a fixed cost of nlan initiation by an organization adopting the model.
Those costs shown in Table I under the headings "Drafting,"
"Construction," "Equipment," "Training," s.nd "Drills" are considered
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to vary linearly -with the size of an organization defined in t< •
floor soace or number of employers. Both of these factors '-re c<
as independently affecting costs and are assigned equal weight.
With the above assmnotions and considerations, an equation ex-
pressing approximate initiation costs of the r>lsn for any size company
ian be written.
Initiation Cost = IC
Fixed Costs = FC
Variable Costs = VC ( Drafting service, Plant Const.
Equirment, Training, First Drill)
wo. of Employees = E
Tloor Space (sqft) = S
Considering variation cf size in terms of l. only:
VCC^R = fl * 3
'
,100 =f1 xE
since Eq., - ''lOO people f., = \ 3.90/employee
Si lilarily, considering variation of size in terms of Z >-uv; :
vc = f7 x S
$17,100 = f x S
2
Since S „ = 10" soft f = 12.1 x K "3 = 12.1 x ]0"5 - $,01?/sqft
0&R 2 53s
Combining all factors: IC - FC ^ Cfl E + f2 S )




Check: , a - 3100
$12,600 = 500 + ( --'.9 x ~1Q0 + .0.1?.! y l". )
2
$12,600 = 500 -i- (i? goo + lp.ioo )
2
$1?,500 = 12,600
APPLICATION OF CO?C EQUATION
In order to determine the reasonableness of the equation, consider
two companies, one larger and one smaller thsn & R Jacksonville:
Comnrny A Corn orny ?
E 500 ennioyees 5»000 employees
S 150,000 sqft 2,500,000 sqft
ICA = 500 + (2.9 x 500 ± .012 x 150.000)"2





ICB =: 500 + (".9 x 5000 + .01? x 2.5 x 1 )
2
= 500 + (19500 30.000 )
2 \
- $25,250
It should be noted in aorlying the initiation cost equation that
approximations t-dll ^en6 toward high estimates since no method is pro-
vided to deduct soil] -over from other programs of ssfety and fire
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-•rotsction already in force; nor ^re economies of scale thai would ?ccrue
to larger organizations considered.
L-ble VII is derived from available National Fire Protection As-
sociation statistics to provide the reader with an average exoected loss
^er occurrence by industry for fire only. These statistics, of course,
cover a broad continuum of severity—from KPsteoarer basket fires with
negligible loss through co:nolete loss of plant and equipment* But recall
that the statistical loss for^all industry ($5000 in 1962 ) does not in-
clude the hidden losses mentioned earlier in this paper which *re
estimated to be in the order of five times the direct loss. Consider
Further that only one type of disaster—an industrial fire—is re-
flected, and a favorable comparison between plan implementation cost




FIRE L03S33 ($) CLASSIFIED PER OCCURRENCE
Industry 1961* 1962** Change
Food- Processing 3200 4700 + 1500
Chemical Petroleum 76OO 9100 + 1500
Ma chining 10700 10000 - 7C0
Kinere
1
14000 20000 + 6000
Educational 4100 5000 + 900
All Industry 4900 5000 + 100
* Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 56,
No. 2, October, 1962, pp, I86-IS7.
Quarterly of the National Fire Protection .Association, Vol. 57
'»
No. 2, October, 1963, pp. 196-197.
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VALUE MJ/' LYSIS OF PLAN ADOPTION
Although a rough approximation of initiation costs of the model
r.*n be derived, there is no similar formula by which an industrial
manager can determine the absolute advantage of the model annlied to
a disaster situation.
If reasonable *>redi ctlanc ;ould be made as to the probability
that nny given company was going to experience a fire or other disaster
during any given period of time, and similarly; if probabilities could
be assigned for the range of loss from negligible to total, then in-
itiation costs of the model could be weighed against expected losses.
The probability of an aircraft crash into a facility «, For those
readers who are associated with factories and companies in close
proximity of airfields, there is application of the "Simulation >
Technique" which can be utilized to assess scientifically the proba-
bility of an aircraft crash into the facility, and, which can be con-
sidered as an assist to the industrial manager in deciding whether the
model plan is worth adapting to his particular situation (It is
recognized that the actual probability of such occurrence may be
exceedingly remote for some firms; the example is drawn only to
presert a demonstration of the technique and as a possible assist for
those with factori.es very close to air facilities.)
16
For a basic and practical application of Simulation Technique."
see: Edward H. Fo«aan and Robert B. Fetter Analysis for Production
Management (Hone*,ood, Illinois: Richard D. Strum, Inc., 19^l)» pp» 3^3 ff«
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Figure 10 represents an area of known size with an air facil:
at the center. Associated traffic patterns and approach corridors -re
indicated* Also indicated are concentric diameter rings of known
distanee from the facility, and portions of a "}60° compass radiating
from the center of it.
Three factories have been located on the figure as represented
by the small areas A, B, and C. Finally, each unnumbered dot repre-
5;ents the historical location of an aircraft crash over a twenty-five
year period.
Assume that the azimuth of the historical crashes (dots) are
distributed "normally" with an average (X) distribution having as its
standard deviation, ?.0°. Consider further that the distribution of
each crash is "exponential" in terms of its distance away from the
facility. ' Based on the two normal distributions (centering around
the two corridors in the figure) and the exponential distance distri-
bution, a simulation problem using Random Numbers can now be established
to determine the probability of a. crash on one of the three factories.
TABLE VIII simulates the r^ndox number ere ne rat ion.
17
Based on the premise that more crashes will occur close to
a landing and take-off facility than at a considerable distance;
a pilot in trouble will look first for a suitable field, and will
a-otsroach it directly if altitude oermits. The ability of a oilot
in trouble to maneuver to avoid structures is based on his altitude,








Side of EL st. fr.
Occurrence RN Corridor RN °»s from C/L RN C/L RN F?cil.(mi)
1 x I x 23 x L x 1.1
2 I 18 R 1.4
3 II 06 L 1.3
4 I 28 L 2.4
5 n 35 R 1.0
6 ii 05 L 3.2
7 i 02 R 1.6
8 i 19 R 1.5
9 i 09 L 4.3
10 ii 07 L 2.6
11 ii 41 R 1.1
12 ii 22 R 1.8
13 ii 02 R 2.2
14 i 05 L 1.3
15 ii 15 L 1.5
16 i 18 R 4.2
17 ii 08 L 3.6
18 i 21 R 1.2
19 i 17 R 1.7
20 ii 05 R 2.4
TABLE VIII
RANDOM NUMBER (R/N) SIMULATION OF CRASH OCCURRENCES
Points derived through the application of randomly generated
numbers are circled and numbered on Figure 10. (The unnumbered dots
present a graphic display of the actual history of air crashes in the
area.) Since the period of time covered by this history is twenty-five
years, and the number of crashes also numbers twenty-five, the frequency
of occurrence in the Simulation may be taken to be one/year, and at the
location circled and numbered on Figure 10.
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It B lould be apparent, then, that the industrial manager can,
through the utilization of Simulation technique, systematically assess
the likelihood that a specific type of disaster will occur. It is
likewise apparent that, given a history of damage severity upon which
to base the "randomness" of occurrence, he can develop a systematic
appraisal of the expected extent of damage.
CONSIDERATION OF MODEL EFFECTIVENESS
Armed now with "educated guesses" as to the likelihood and extent
of damage occurring, the manager can compute total expected loss without
the model disaster control plan in effect:
Capital Investment = CI
Probability of an occurrence during a given time
period, (t)-P(
t )
Expected # loss = L (in decimal percentage)
Insurance Coverage = I
Expected Loss (t) =(P 4J. N x L x CI - I) + 5(P/j xX L x CI)wo (t) Kt)
Similarly, he can make a computational estimate giving consideration
to the fact that the model plan has been incorporated into his organi-
zational structure. In this situation, however, an additional estimate
of model effectiveness (ME) is necessary. ME is the individual estimate
by which the presence of the model plan is expected to reduce L. That
is, if L is estimated at .25, and ME is estimated at .5* ther




Expected Loss,, v = (P xLxMExCI- I)+5(P, . xLxMExCI)
vww (t; (t)
Savings to be expected over a given period of time, in the event a
disaster is experienced during that period, is a function of:
Expected Loss /. \ wo
Expected Loss /. \ w
Cost of initiating and maintaining the model during the same period.
Data from NAS Jacksonville shows maintenance cost for the first
year of operation to be $32,00. This is approximately 0.3$ of initi-
ation cost for the model. Maintenance cost include only those costs
experienced because of model initiation. The costs of drills during the
year is not included since this was a pre-initiation cost.
From the above considerations, expected savings in the event of a
disaster may be expressed as follows:
Expected Savings , * Expected Loss/, x - IC(HHm) + Expected Loss, N
where i rate of interest that could be obtained if initiation funds
were invested elsewhere
m maintenance cost per year
IC
As an example, consider Company A, whicl has 500 employees, 150,000
sq ft of production space, and $2,500,000 in capital investment. The
company is 100# underwritten for fire loss:
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The manager estimates the following:
Probability of e fire during the next ten years = P = .10
vt )
Expected $ Loss =* L = .25
Model Effectiveness = ME = .5
Interest Attainable - i = .06
Maintenance cost per year/lC - m = .005
6 6
Expected Loss,. N =(.10 x .25 x 2.5 x 10 - .1 x .25 x 2.5 x 10 )
It, /wo
+ 5M0 x .25 x 2.5 x 106 ) a + 5(62,500)
$312.500
Expected Loss, y. - ME(Expected loss, * ) .5 x $312,500 = $156.250
Expected Savings/
t
\= Expected Loss, * - IC(l+i + m) + Expected
Loss .
(t)wj
$312,500 - $2375(1 + .06 + .005)10 + $156,250
= $312,500 - ($4458 + $156,250)
= $312,500 - 160,708 = $141.792
Lest the savings above appear overly optimistic, reference will
be made to another example. Using the same basic data, except that
the Expected Loss for a ten year period is 5(5*000) = $25,000;
(t)wo
the actual loss of $5,000 is covered by insurance, and the $25,000




Expected Savings $25,000 - $2375(1 + «06 + .005/ + .5 x 25,000j
(t)w '
= $25,000 - ($4458 + $12,500) = $8,042
In other words, Company A, experiencing one $5000 fire (average
for industry) for which it is insured, having spent $2,375 as initiation
cost for the model and with a model effectiveness of 50$ can expect to
reduce the expected loss from fire a little more than 30$ providing
the probability of 1.0 is assigned as the likelihood of occurrence
during the period under consideration.
COST SAVINGS BARRING DISASTER
Schlaifer indicates that it is impossible to make sure that every
decision will turn out to have been right when these decisions are made
1
8
under conditions of uncertainty. This is certainly true when trying
to decide the amount of dollar savings that can result from the use of
a disaster control plan. If it were possible to determine in advance
just when a fire, hurricane, explosion, earthquake or flood was going
to occur; or when a falling aircraft was going to crash through the
roof structure of a plant; and, if these events occurred, what their
cost was going to be, then it would be much easier to determine how
much money to spend to reduce or minimize the effects of such disasters.
Robert Schlaifer, Introduction to Statistics for Business
Decisions . (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961), P« 3°
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The Cost of Uncertainty * Under uncertainty, management is forced
in effect, to gamble. Previous histories of such occurrences actually
happening put management in a position where a wbetw must be made,
hoping that the bet may be won, but knowing it may be lost. Under
such circumstances, a right decision consists of a choice of the best
possible MbetH (alternative); whether it is won or lost is a matter
after the fact.
Let us now consider two value judgments as a method of assessing
the choice between implementing a disaster control plan similar to
the model, or not doing so as the case may be; and, determine the
expected savings which accrued at & R Jacksonville as a direct
result therefrom. For the purpose of the following analysis, consider
that no, advantage will be derived from use of the plan in terms of
reduced property loss in the event of disaster, and that the only
advantage which is derived will be as a result of the better organi-
zation that the plan allows. It will be left to the reader to adjust
or adapt as necessary the following examples to his own specific
circumstances
•
The Reduced Expected Cost of False Alarms «, At & R Jacksonville,
historical records indicated that there was a fire alarm (automatic
or manual) sounded within the department (1 of 11 zones) on the
average of two and one-half times per month over a ten year period
•
Of this average, two per month were assessed as false; the remaining
one e/ery two months was actually caused by a fire The relative
78

frequency of occurrence of these false alarms in one particular zone
as compared to the other ten zones was such that Zone 3^7 had a false
alarm three times as often, and Zones 341, 3*f2, 3^5, and 3^6 had a
false alarm twice as often as the remaining six zones
o
Table IX sets forth the eleven & R Fire and Hurricane Zones,
the average number of workers employed in each zone (who, prior to
the installation of the model plan, would normally have evacuated
each zone during a fire alarm, false or otherwise), the number of
workers who man fire stations only (under the model plan), and the
number of workers who now remain at their jobs unless directed to
secure (an event which will not occur during a false alarm). Table
IX also indicates the relative frequency of false alarm occurrence
within each zone with respect to each of the other zones
•
The average time required to answer, assess, and terminate each
false alarm was twenty minutes. However, the historical distribution
of these times ranged from not less than ten minutes, to times in
excess of one hour, thus presenting the skewed distribution seen in
Figure 11.
Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) direct and indirect labor (overhead)
was normally budgeted at the rate of $7.00 per total manhours worked.
Given the relative frequency of false alarms among the various
zones, and the skewed distribution of time required to administer








PERSONS FIRE REMAINING RELATIVE
EMPLOYED STATIONS ON THE JOB ALARM
IN ZONE NEW PLAN (NEW PLAN) OCCURRENCE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
224 65 15 50 1
227 229 25 204 1
336 5* 20 34 1
341 378 60 318 2
342 435 20 415 2
343 78 8 70 1
345 140 18 122 2
346 600 55 &5 2
347 675 40 635 3
346 271 25 246 1




DISTRIBUTION OF TIME TO ADMINISTER ALARMS
10 15 20 25 30 35 *«) 50 55 60 65 70





NOTE: Discard R/Ns drawn but
not assigned*
Average tdrae-20 min», Maximum time-60 min<>, Minimum time-10 min.




example, again using the random number techniques
Consider a time period of one month in which two false alarms
occur. As can be seen from Table IX, a false alarm in Zones 224,
227, 336, 3^3, 348, and 349 are all equally likely 9 whereas an alarm
in Zones 341, 342, 245, and 346 is twice as likely, and an alarm in
Zone 3^7 is three times as likely to occur. Ey weighing each possi-
bility of occurrences as one unit, then totaling units, a sum of T?
is obtained. In order .to facilitate the use of standard random tables
(two digit numbers), multiply the total units (17) arbitrarily by 5
to obtain a value of 85. Ey distributing 85 numbers over the relative
alarm distribution, a pattern for simulation is obtained in Table X,
i» e», each unit of occurrence may be simulated by the selection of
one of five random numbers
Next, consider the skewed distribution of time required to
administer each alarm. By assigning random numbers to segmented areas
under the curve which represent time periods, a simulation of time may
also be obtained for each alarm.
Once the zones under alarm in any one month is determined, and
the time each zone remains under alarm is likewise determined, the
difference in numbers of personnel required to function under the old
method and the new (Table IX, Column 3) multiplied by the time off the
19




RANDOM NUMBER ASSIGNMENT FOR SIMULATION OF ALARM
IN & R FIRE AND HURRICANE ZONES












NOTE* discard R/Ns drawn but not assigned (00,86-99)
S3

job (obtained from Figure 11), and again by the NIF labor overhead rate
of $7«00 per hour, vill provide an estimate of expected savings resulting
from using the new system.
For example: Assume that the Random numbers (R/Ns) 28 and 61 are
drawn from standard random number tables to determine the zones under
alarm. These R/Ns applied to Table X indicate that Zones 342 and 347
are simulated as having a false alarm in January. Next, assume that
the R/Ns 04 and 53 are selected to be applied to Figure 11 to determine
how long each of the two zones are under alarm • Since the R/N 04 was
not assigned, it should be discarded and another drawn. Therefore,
assume that the R/N 22 is drawn to replace the unassigned R/N 04. It
will be noted in the first instance, that the R/N 53 when applied to
Figure 11, falls in area IV which signals the application of the
average time of 45 minutes to be applied; likewise the R/N 22 falling
in area HI under the curve of Figure 11 signals that 29 minutes should
be applied to the other occurrence. Finally, noting from Table IX that
in Zone 3^2, 415 men will remain on the job as a result of the new plan,
when the zone is under alarm for 45 minutes (Figure 11), and that in
Zone 3^7 » ^35 men will remain on the job when that zone is under alarm
for 29 minutes, we can establish the following expected cost saving
equations.
For: Zone 342, 415(men) x 45/60(tirae) x $7.00 = $2179
347, 635 x 29/60 x 7o00 = 2146
Expected Savings Simulated for Jan. $4327
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Similar simulations may be made for other months, thus creating an
indication of the possible annual savings or average monthly savings
as a result of handling false alarms in the manner prescribed in the
model plan. As mentioned in Chapter H, the expected average monthly
savings derived by actual data at & R Jacksonville, was $3000/month,
to which the above simulation compares favorably
THE REDUCED EXPECTED COST OF SECURING FOR HURRICANES ,
Consider further the reduced cost required to effect adequate
hurricane security when required at & R Jacksonvilleo Here again,
the reader can assess his own similarity of situation and apply the
following cost reduction criteria if it is applicable
o
By military order, & R Jacksonville was required to establish
various conditions of security based on U. S. Weather Bureau hurricane
forecasts for the Northeast Florida area. As previously quoted
(Chapter II), & R top management indicated that as a result of the
model plan, the time required to shut down the plant under Hurricane
Condition I (most severe) was reduced from six to two hours. This
shutdown involved the effort of about 1000 production workers, whereas
prior to the plan, plant shutdown was accomplished by plant maintenance
personnel (about 250 workers)* Similarly, upon securing from a set
condition, the time to regain normal capacity operations was reduced
from three hours to one hour and involved the same number of workers
•
Military Instruction' also established hurricane condition
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criteria, i. e«>, three conditions of hurricane security were es-
tablished; Condition III was a seasonal condition set on 1 July of
each year and remained in effect until 1 January of the following
year. This Condition required a general policing of the outside
area, along with reports to higher authority ss to the condition
having been set; and the inventory of hurricane securing equipment.
Condition H was set whenever Jacksonville was within the twenty-
four hour projected path probability of an established hurricane.
This condition required a personal supervisory check of Condition III
maintenance and a breakout of hurricane security equipment • Condition
I was set when Jacksonville was within the twelve hour projected path
probability of an established hurricane (hurricane imminent) and
required complete plant "shutdown and secure" until Condition II
could be re-established* Since the setting of Conditions in and H,
and the actual time secured under Condition I held equal weight under
the new plan as well as the old, only the time required to actually
"set" Condition I had a marginal cost aspect which differed from one
plan to the other. The new plan also utilized about 750 production
workers over and above the 250 plant maintenance personnel normally
used under the old securing system.
Since plant securing time was reduced four hours and unsecuring
time was reduced two hours under the new plan 9 the plant could, in
effect, continue to operate six hours longer under the new plan than
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could have been allowed previously when Condition I was set.
The following example will serve to demonstrate another approach
in determining expected hurricane securing cost reductions from using
the new plan. Once again, the NIF labor overhead of $7«00 per hour
normally budgeted to the cost of production will be usedo
Historical records indicated that hurricane warnings requiring
the setting of Condition I occurred at Jacksonville on the average of
one time every three years , and lasted for an average period of 24
hours* The plant, operating under a five-day week, would not lose
productive time if security was set on Saturday or Sundayo The distri-
bution of the particular day during the week upon which hurricane
conditions had to be set was "rectangular." AH workers not engaged
in shutdown operations were considered on the payroll as of the time
the alarm was set until the end of the normal working day.
Cost of stutdown under old system ,
250 - workers (plant maintenance)
x$7.00 -/hr NIF Budget Cost
$1750 -/hour
x 9 - hours required to shutdown and then reopen
$15»750 - Total Cost to Shutdown and Reopen for each Condition I seto
(Old Plan)
Cost of shutdown under new plan.
1000 - workers
x $7.00 -/hr NIF Budget Cost
$7000 -/hour
x 3 - hours required to shutdown and reopen




Difference of productive time cost«-savings available under new
plan.
9 hours reauired to secure and unsecure under old system
- 3 hours required to secure and unsecure under new system
o hours productive time not sacrificed
x 2750 production workers (3000 plant workers less 250 maintenance workers)
16,500 manhours not sacrificed
x $7.00/hour NIF Budget cost
$115,500 productive time cost savings
Total savings for each setting of Condition I
115,500 - (21,000 - 15,750) =$110,250
Assuming that a shutdown was called on a working day 9 (Monday through
Friday), by using 750 production workers in addition to 250 plant
maintenance workers, the actual plant securing and unsecuring could be
delayed six hours, resulting in a marginal cost savings of $110,250 on
each occurrence. Assuming that warnings were set on Saturday and
removed on Sunday, no marginal savings would accrue since the old
method of using plant maintenance personnel vould be usedo If however,
a warning occurred on Friday and was removed on Saturday 9 a partial cost
involving the four hour differential for securing would apply• Similarly,
if Condition I was set on Sunday and removed on Monday, the two hour
differential for unsecuring would provide a partial cost savings •
Table XI sets forth the average savings which will accrue assuming
the savings specified in the Table for securing on one particular day
and unsecuring 24 hours later • The average cost indicated in Table XI
also assumes that a warning on any one day is equally likely, i.e.,
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has a probability of 1/7
•
TABLE XI
EXPECTED COST SAVINGS FROM DELAYED SECDRING/UNSECURING
DAY SECURED DAY UNSECURED TIME DIFFERENTIAL EXPECTED SAVINGS
(hours)
Monday Tuesday 6 $110,250
Tuesday Wednesday 6 110,250
Wednesday Thursday 6 110,250
Thursday Friday 6 110 ,250
Friday Saturday k 73,500
Saturday Sunday
Sunday Monday 2 36,750
$551,250
Total expected savings (each occurrence) regardless
of day of occurrence $ 78,750
Given that Condition I will be set on an average of once every
three years: $78,750 / 3 = $26,250 (The expected savings per year
resulting from hurricane security under the new plan)»
SUMMARY
This Chapter has presented the compiled results of a questionnaire
(Appendix B) that was sent to two hundred industrial organizations of
varying size and function e While the level of response (17/0 was
considerably less than hoped for, the data received was useful in
demonstrating the lack, in general, of an overall plan of disaster
control in American industry; additionally, that there are indications
of a dangerously high degree of company dependence upon full«time fire
and medical personnel for the control and minimization of damage*
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The development of a cost equation for evaluating the imple-
mentation cost of a disaster control plan in individual firms was
described and illustrated. Comparison to NFPA average fire loss
statistics in different industries was provided to support the
industry-wide adaptation of Naval Damage Control principles*
Finally, the Chapter led the reader through an examination of the
possibilities surrounding an application of Simulation techniques to
questions of disaster frequency and severity within an individual
firm. An approach for evaluating the model disaster control plan
exclusive of any advantage derived from actual damage minimization
was also presented in the form of two examples i Reduced expected cost







Throughout the presentation of this paper, it has been the intent
to demonstrate the possibilities surrounding an application of Naval
Damage Control principles to American industry. Specifically, the
purpose has been to show that the development of an overall plan to
coordinate the activities of employees during an emergency can be of
significant value to the individual firm in controlling and minimizing
damage to facilities.
It is patently clear that the model plan developed for use at
& R Jacksonville will not be suitable for precise duplication at
every industrial organization. Conceivably, the implementation of a
plan to divide a firm into the pattern of Areas and Zones discussed
in Chapter II, and to establish the disaster control teams required
by the division, could prove to be grossly impractical and unwieldy..
It is manifest, then, that the "mechanics" of organization for
any individual firm can be developed most effectively by the person
who has the greatest knowledge of that firm—the individual industrial
manager. In the acceptance of this industrial fact of life, the writers
have not attempted to show the advantages of an identical model plan
implementation in industry, but rather, the benefits that have been
realized at & R Jacksonville, and which by appropriate plan modi-
fication, could accrue to other industrial organizations
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There are no harbored illusions that the conversion by American
industry to a coordinated plan of disaster control -will gain over-
night widespread acceptance. It is unfortunate, but nonetheless true,
that a substantial number of readers will reject the model presented
as "too much ado" about a phase of industrial life about which an
industrial manager has too little interest • A most meaningful
evidence of this apathetic attitude was the disappointingly low
response (17$) to the survey questionnaire forwarded for completion
and return.
Yet the principle of controlling damage is generally accepted
as sound. There is no other explanation for the sizeable expenditures
for fire protection, fire prevention, first-aid facilities, special
fireproof structures, and industrial safety devices within American
industry. In this context, the decision to ignore a readily available
group—the employees—that with proper training and organization can
transform itself into effective Damage Control teams must surely be
questioned.
All that remains is to recount some mistakes made in formulation
of the survey questionnaire, and to suggest some possibilities for
further research.
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
It is recognized now that the question phrasing, notably question
5 (a) and 5 (b) is too attractive for a broad, generalized, and
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non-informative answer* Further, question 6 should have been re-
phrased to include a request for copies of the First-Aid * Industrial
Safety, Fire Prevention, etc., programs reported as being in effect*
This would have served two purposes: 1) the acquisition of an expanded
description of company programs for more accurate survey compilation,
and 2) facilitating questionnaire completion by requiring less of the
respondents time necessary to research the requested information.*
Question 7 (d) likewise should have included & request for ap-
propriate written instructions to provide a basis for sensible
compilation.
The accompanying letter of explanation for the survey contained
the following statement:
You are assured that information contained in your response
will be held in confidence, and that any publication thereof
will be made under complete anonymity unless prior and specific
permission to cite your company is obtained*
The above notwithstanding, firms were, generally, unwilling to
provide answers to questions 9 (b) and 9 (c) concerning amounts of
insurance in force. It is apparent that the use of a questionnaire
is unsatisfactory as a method of acquiring this type of proprietary
information; and it is believed that direct interviews, while not
possible for the writers, would have elicited more information*
POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
An obvious area for additional research presents itself in the
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application of the model plan to a specific firm 8 and compiling
comparative advantages and disadvantages over a fixed period of time
One year from the date of plan implementation is suggested as an
appropriate intervale
Short of actual conversion to an overall plan of disaster control,
another possible area for additional research would be to seek out a
small number of companies of assorted size and function* Through
utilization of Simulation techniques and with the necessarily close
cooperation of managements, it should be possible to make a meaningful
assessment of the model plan value for each of them A project of this
sort would require accessibility to:
1. company cost records,
2. company history of physical losses and causes thereof,
3. amounts of insurance in force©
Most importantly, it would require a willingness by management to
at least consider the idea that they have within their present organi-
zation the means for reducing losses.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has outlined an approach to one of the major problems
facing industrial management now and in the foreseeable future. The
method of approach is relatively simple • It can be described as
"taking a second look" at what can be done with an existing organi-




The decision to adapt the model plan to any individual firm must
be based upon the careful weighing of factors, some of which are im-
possible to evaluate without making assumptions • Simulation techniques
have been suggested as a method of systematizing the assignment of
probabilities to aid this evaluation*.
But utilization of this approach, or any other 9 is dependent upon
the existence of a belief by management that Naval Damage Control
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%«f: From: OverhauT and Repair Officer
To: >i! Distribution" List D'
Subj: Disaster Control Organization; promulgation of
Reft' (a) Disaster Control Recovery Plan 3-60 -(DCRP-6ND )..;.'' •»
ly^-y (b) U. S. Disaster Control Manual (OPNAVINST P3UU0.6) •"
'"' (c) NASJAXINST 11320.1C of h Dec 1959, Subjx Fire Prevention
and Fire Protection Measures'*
'•"
••






xi •' . •; (e) NASJAXINST 3730.1C of 28 May 1959, Subji NAS Jacksonville







: (f) NASJAXINST 31U0.1B of 27 May 1958, Subjt Station' Storm
...
.-. Bill • ••• : - '.•*> ,,;




' Unit (DCU 6.3.1); Organization of
'
Ehcl i | ' (1) ; Disaster Fire and Hurricane ' ZONES ' within" the O&ft J
'-
•';''
' Department / ' >v .. .:'
•wlVU (2) Area Coordinators, Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshals*/
J>" and other Team Leaders Organization'
•e«oi*.i (3)- Zone Disaster Control Team Organization ' '' * ! .'
---
,{
'(U) Area and Zone Disaster Control Organization' Boards^ •
•;r. -. .•.!-.. Drawings/ and Bills • ;'\ r
N (5) 0<SR Department Hurricane Security, Aircraft Hurricane
Evacuation, and Storm Security Bills
fcOZfftXh;,. :
:(6) o«SR Disaster, Fire and Hurricane Warning . 'Signals-~~:~
(7) Administrative and Operational Inspection Form for
.
Disaster Control Drills
1. Purpose . This Instruction publishes a disaster control organ-
's;- : ->-' ization plan for the O&R Department which includes organization
• 'for fire, damage control, hurricane security, and other assistance
needed in time of emergency.
*ic r. •- -• •...'•
2. Cancellation . This 1 Instruction cancels O&R Instruction 3l4i0.1
of 16 November 1962 and SUP-1 of 13 February 1963.
3« Background Reference (a) directs NAS Jacksonville to organize,
train, and equip a minimum number of disaster control teams as
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Reference (b) recommends the number and type of persqnnel, the
equipment required, and the functions to be performed by the
members of these teams. Reference (c) sets forth fire prevention
and fire protection measures for NAS JAX. References (d), '(e),
and (f) set forth NAS JAX hurricane security, hurricane evacuation,
and storm security conditions^., Reference (g) establishes the
NAS JAX disaster control organization and outlines team assign-
ments. This Instruction supplements reference (g),
iu Organization , Unless otherwise designated, the Assistant
Overhaul and Repair Officer is hereby designated Disaster Control
Officer for the O&R Department, and will be directly responsible
to the Overhaul and Repair Officer for all disaster control plans,
training, and organization within the Department, The Production
Manager will be his alternate. The O&R Disaster Control Officer shall
further be responsible under the provisions of references (d), (e),
and (f) for effective implementation of hurricane security,
hurricane evacuation, and storm security measures as established
in enclosure (£), The same responsibilities, organization, and
action required for hurricane security shall apply to storm
conditions set throughout the year by NAS Aerology and hurricane
evacuation conditions set by COMFAIRJAX, In over-all coordination •>
of his responsibilities, the O&R Disaster Control Officer shall
effect liaison with the NAS Jacksonville Disaster Control Unit
(6,3.1) as necessary for the effective performance of his office.
He shall be supported by a coordinating staff of functional
advisers. This staff shall b6 composed of the following positions.
(Personnel occupying the designated billet descriptions shall
fill these positions and shall be known as Departmental Disaster
Control Staff Assistants.)
DEPARTMENTAL STAFF ASSISTANTS PERSONNEL BILLET DESCRIPTION
l . i i i ii - i - i - - n ii M—WW———— ii» i——^——>—i——fc—**——)—
Fire & Hurricane Marshal..*^ ^ Shops Officer
Alternate , Shops Superintendent
First Aid Assistant Administrative Services Officer
Alternate Adm Services Superintendent
Damage Control Assistant Production Engineering Officer
Alternate. „-•
.
, Prod Engineering Supt
Communications & Traffic Assistant Production Planning Officer
Alternate Prod Planning Supt
Decontamination Assistant Aircraft Transfer Officer
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The O&R Department shall be divided into two Disaster Control Areas,
each of uhich shall be headed by a Disaster Control Area Coordinator,
or his alternate. Each Disaster Control Area Coordinator shall bo
supported by an Area First Aid Support Team, an Area Emergency
Rescue Support Team, and an Area Communication and Traffic Support
Team. Each Disaster Control Area shall further bo divided into
several fire and damage control zones, which correspond to current
MAS fire sub-zones (hereinafter referred to only as "zones")*. Each
zone shall be headed by a Zone Fire and Hurrioano Marshal and shall
support several Fire and Damage Control Teams under team leaders.
Fire and Damage Control Teams shall be composed of those personnel
assigned to Fire and/or Damage Control Bills within the various
shops within the zone. The Disaster Control Organization as a
whole will also be used to accomplish that hurricane security
which is required by this Instruction. Disaster Control Areas,
with their respective zoning and mobilization points, are specified
in enclosure (l). Disaster Control Area Coordinators, their
, supporting area First Aid, Emergency Rescue, and Communication and
Traffic Support Teams, Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshals, and other
team leaders, are set forth in enclosure (2).« Enclosure (3)
provides the typical zone team organization. Enclosure (U)
provides the system for training, organizing, and implementing
the Disaster Control Program in OdiR, Assignment of personnel
will be made as required on the various Disaster Control .Bills
and Organization Boards enumerated in enclosure (U). Distribution
of these bills will also be as indicated in enclosure (U)«
Assignments will be made for each working shift "and will be
reviewed every six weeks. Each Disaster Control Area Coordinator,
assisted by the several Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshals, in turn
assisted by the various team leaders and supporting teams, shall 1
be known as an Area Disaster Control Group. The Area Disaster
Control Group as a whole is the smallest organizational unit
which can function with complete autonomy in any emergency (i.e.,
in the event of disaster, all of the services normally required
of an emergency crow can be provided by each Area Disaster
Control Group). The functional elements composing each zone
team will include the primary O&R fire fighting capability and
.necessary engineering services that are required to minimize
damage in the event of fire, explosion, contamination, impending
disaster, and ready rescue. The zone team will further, possess
the capability for obtaining and maintaining hurricane security
conditions required in enclosure (5)« The O&R Decontamination
Team will be composed of Military Enlisted personnel and will
report directly to the O&R Disaster Control Officer for
operational control and to the O&R Decontamination Assistant for
technical and administrative control. Disaster Control Toam 80
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working as a standby crew during non-xrorking hours, and will
report directly to tho O&R Department Duty Officer fpr operational
Control, and to the O&R Damage Control Assistant for technical
and administrative control. Enclosure (6) sets forth O&R Disaster
"Warning Signals, Enclosure (7) provides a format for evaluating
all Disaster Control Drills to be held in the department.
I>. Action, To implement the administrative organization
delineated in the enclosures and to provide a plan of action in
any. emergency situation, the following responsibilities and
authorities are assigned:
a, O&R Disaster Control Officer will t
(1) Insure that the organizing, training, and equipping
of assigned personnel are conducted as set forth by enclosure (U),
.
(2) Insure that liaison is established between departmental
and station control elements since the department as an industrial
complex is not specifically associated with the NAS Disaster
Control Organization,
(3) Be responsible for and assume control over Area
Disaster Control Groups when required by emergency,
b. Departmental Disaster Control Staff Assistants will ;
(1) Organize Area Support Teams and appoint team leaders
as required by enclosure (2),
(2) Develop a syllabus to insure adequate and timely
training in specific skills involved,
(3) Provide coordinated training in each of the various
skills indicated for personnel assigned to the respective
positions in the Area Disaster Control Groups,
(U) Compile specified outfitting requirements and submit
list of materials for procurement to tho O&R Disaster Control
Officer,
(5>) Coordinate the specific functions of tho Disaster
Control Group Teams from a department standpoint when directed
by the O&R Disaster Control Officer.
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(7) Periodically rcvisw the functions and organizations
for which they arc responsible
•
(8) Insure >that the latest approaches and techniques for
action are being employed.
c. Group Superintendents will review enclosure (2) and assign
billeted personnel to indicated positions.
d; Each Disaster, Control Area Coordinator will :
(1) Assist in the development of Department Disaster
Control plans and review area material requirements.
(2) Prepare and locate Area Disaster Control Organization
Boards (enclosure (u))»
(3) Insure that appropriate internal Disaster Control
Organization Boards, Drawings, and Bills, as required to cope
with fire, damage control, and hurricane security, are established
and maintained by subordinate zones.
(U) Establish review requirements for personnel assignments
to Zone Disaster Control Bills.
(5) Review material requirements for Zone Damage Control
Gear Lockers,
(6) Assume operational control of his respective Area
Disaster Control Group and be responsible to the O&R Disaster
Control Officer for:
(a) The function of his group in any emergency.
(b) The securing of either Disaster Control Area in
the event of any emergency. based on his judgement and estimate
of the situation at hand.
(c) The currency of Disaster Control Bills throughout
his area.
(d) The scheduling of disaster control drills
within his area so that there is at least one drill per quarter.
e. Each Area First Aid Support Team Leader will :
(l) Take charge of his respective Area First Aid Support
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(2) Insure that o*ch team member avails himself of the




(30 Assume custody of first aid equipment ap provided
and insure propor stowage and inventory of supplies.
(U) Coordinate the over-all capability of his respective
team. Unless otherwise directed by the Departmental First Aid
Assistant, he will be responsible to his Area Disaster Control
Coordinator for the function of his team in any emergency.
NOTE: The complement of each Area First Aid Support Team will
be evenly distributed among the various zones, which shall have
a minimum of three personnel assigned to the team from each zone.
In the event of an area alert, fire, or disaster, the appropriate
First Aid Support Team will report to the designated area mobi-
lization point. Team members from each zono will bring with them
the equipment for which they are responsible. In the event of a
zone fire or emergency, the zone segment of the Area Support Team
will report to the involved zone and render necessary aid.
When required, each member of the Area First Aid Support Team will /
be expected to rendor first aid to any person at any time in his
general work area. Aid will be continued until the person can
be taken to the dispensary, or until personnel from the Medical *
Department arrive and take charge.
f. Each Area Emergency Roscuc Support Team Leader will :
(1) Take charge of his respective Area Emergcricy Rescue
Support Team as organized by the Departmental Damage Control
Assistant. *
(2) Insure that each team member avails himself of the
training provided; and keep records of attendance at training
sessions.
(3) Assume custody of emergency rescue equipment as
provided, and insure efficient stowage, inventory, and mobility
of supplies.
(h) Review material requirements for zone dnmage control
goarlockers and make additional needs known to the Departmental
Damage Control Staff Assistant.
,
(5>) Coordinate the over-all capability of his respective
team. Unless otherwise directed by the Departmental Damage
Control Assistant, he will bo responsible to the Aroa Disaster
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NOTE: Each Area Emergency Rescue Support Team will be complemented
with personnel from the Pl^nt Sendees Division, The teams will be
supported by 'technically rated personnel such as welders, plumbers,
riggers, carpenters, electricians, he3.pers, and others, who will
-have available to them a mobile supply of tools and equipment which
can move quickly with them to the scene of an emergency. Upon the
sounding of any area or zone emergency (other than an Alert) the
appropriate Area Emergency Rescue Support Team will mobilize itself
and its equipment} and will proceed at once to the designated area
mobilization point for further assignment. Once on scene, the Area
Emergency Rescue Support Team will assume control of Zone Ready
Rescue Teams and effect necessary rescue operations.
g. Each Area Communication and Traffic Support Team Leader will :
(1) Take charge of his respective Area Communications and
Traffic Support Team as organized by the Departmental Communications
and Traffic Assistant,
(2) Insure that each team member avails himself of in-
struction provided; and keep records of attendance at training
sessions,
(3) Coordinate the over-all capability of his respective
team. Unless otherwise directed by the Departmental Communi- '
cations and Traffic Assistant, he will bo responsible to the Area
Disaster Control Coordinator for the function of his team in any
emergency.
NOTE: The complement of each Area Ccmmunications and Traffic
Team will be evenly distributed among the various zones which shall
have a minimum of three personnel assigned to the team from each
zone. In the event of an area alert, fire, or disaster, the
appropriate Communications and Traffic Support Team will report to
the designated area mobilization point for assignment in the control
of traffic and communications. In the event of a zone fire or
emergency, the zone segment of the Area Communications and Traffic •
Support Team will report to the affected zone and render tho support.
Once on scene, the Communications and Traffic Support Team, or
segment thereof, will assume control over "handi-talkie" communi-
cations provided by Security. '
-'' h. Each Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal will ;
(1) Develop Disaster Control Bills, and training and
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(2) Prepare and locate zone Disaster Control Organization
Boards as required by enclosure (U).
(3) Develop material requirements for and prpvide Damage
Control Gear Lockers where unique rescue equipment may be required.
• (10 Supervise and coordinate zone team organizations and
operations as specified by enclosure (I4)
(5) Insure that training plans as established by the 0&R
Fire and Hurricane Marshal and the 0&R Damage Control Assistant are
carried out,
(6) Be responsible to the 0&R Fire and Hurricane Marshal
for the selecting and scheduling of his zone for at least one fire
drill per quarter,
(7) Perform and report the results of monthly fire
equipment inspections a,s required by reference (c).
(8) Utilize zone teams to effect hurricane security
required by enclosure (5>).
(9) Assume operational control of his respective Zone Fire
and Damage Control Teams, and be responsible to the appropriate
Area Disaster Control Coordinator for:
(a) The functioning of his zone teams in any emergency,
(b) The securing' of my zone in the event of any
emergency based on his judgment and estimate of the situation at
hand,
(c)' The currency of Disaster Control Organization
Boards, Drawings, and Eills throughout his zone, including the
adequate manning of Damage Control Gear Lockers by Ready Rescue
personnel, (see enclosure (I4), NOTE 1.)
*-• Fire Team Leaders will :
(1) As sumo functional control of all personnel assigned to
fire stations within the appropriate zone, and be responsible to
the Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal for the training and indoctri-
nation of all zone fire fighting personnel.
(2) Assume operational control of 0&R fire fighting
personnel during zone or area emergency.
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(l) Assiime functional control of all personnel assigned to
damage control stations within the appropriate zone, end be responsi-
ble to the Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal for the training and
indoctrination of all .zone damage control personnel.-
(2) "Assume operational control of O&R damage control
personnel during Zone or Aroa emergency.
(3) Prepare. list of equipment and facilities found within
his respective zone which require some type of attention in the
event of an emergency and/or impending disaster. (Criteria for
establishing such a list will be: Could damage be limited or
prevented by pr.opcr attention to the equipment specified? ) These
lists of items accompanied by recommendations for action will be-
come a basis .for operative action on Damage Control Plans., Copies
of these lists will be maintained by Plant Services; the compi- •
lation of vhich will represent "The Department Damage Control
Survey."
.,,
(10 Initiate equipment requirements ' for Zone Damage Control
Gear Lockers, and, recommend size of Ready Rescue Team required to
man these lockers,






k. Each Shop Supervisor (except in the 2000 Division and
52OO and 5300 Branches whoro the Branch Supervisor) will: .''
(1) Assist his respective Damage Control Team Leader in
the preparation of lists of equipment and facilities which require
some type of attention in the event of an emergency or impending
disaster. ' -.:....:.. .
(2) Assist in the preparation of material requirements for,
damage control.
'./< •••" .' • - •- - •.;'---• >
(3)' Prepare, post, and assign personnel to Disaster Control
Bills within his area.
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(5) In the event of a shop emergenoy, assume operational
control of assigned Disaster Control personnel and be responsible
to his respective Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal for:
(a) The immediate securing of any shop and/or branch
in any emergency based on his judgment and estimate of the situation
at hand.
(b) The adequate passing of the word or alarm to the
Zone Organization Point in order that others with a need to know
are properly informed.
(c) The availability of his assigned disaster control
personnel to their respective Fire and/or Damage Control Team
Leaders in the event an emergency situation extends beyond his own
shop and/or branch,
1. The Security Force (Main Entrance 0<SR) will t
(1) Sound the proper Zone Disaster or Fire Alarm or Alert
signal throughout the Department, as specified in enclosure (6).
(2) Provide one security guard with "Handi-Talkie" to the
appropriate mobilization point in the event of any alarm. (Guard
will report to the head of the respective area Communications and
Traffic Support Team for communication relay to Security Desk,)
(3) Relay necessary communications to intradepartmental
disaster control elements as specified in reference (g).
(U) Report fire and damage hazards which are found within
the department during working hours to the department Fire and
Hurricane Marshal and/or Station Fire Department, After working
hours or during shutdown operations, hazards should be reported to
the O&R Duty Officer,
t
m, O&R personnel will t
(1) Han assigned Disaster Control Stations promptly on
signal and/or when required,
(2) Promptly report all fires to the Fire Department and
potential hazards to the Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal.
(3) Assist as assigned or directed in the fighting of
fires or the minimizing of damage as the result of any emergency*
106
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(5) In t&e event c£ a shop emergenoy, assume operational
control of assigned Disaster Control personnel and be responsible
to his respective Zone Fire and Hurricane >farshal for:
(a) The immediate, securing of any shop and/or branch
in any emergency based on his judgment and estimate of the situation
at hand.
(b) The adequate passing of the word or alarm to the
Zone Organization Point in order that others with a need to know
are properly informed,
(c) The, availability of his assigned disaster control
personnel to their respective Fire and/or Damage Control Team
Leaders in the event an emergency situation extends beyond his own
shop and/or branch,
1, The Security Force (Main Entrance 0&3.) will ;
(1) Sound the proper Zone Disaster or Fire Alarm or Alert
signal throughout the Department, as specified in enclosure (6),
(2) Provide one security guard with "Handi-Talkie" to the
appropriate mobilization point in the event of any alarm* (Guard
will report to the head of the respective area Communications and
Traffic Support Team for communication relay to Security Desk,)
(3) Relay necessary communications to intradepartmental
disaster control elements as specified in reference (g),
(U) Report fire and damage hazards which are found within
the department during vorking hours to the department Fire and
Hurricane Marshal and/or Station Fire Department, After working
hours or during shutdown operations, hazards should be reported to
the Om Duty Officer,
i
ra. 0£R personnel will ;
(1) Man assigned Disaster Control Stations promptly on
signal and/or when required,
(2) Promptly report all fires to the Fire Department and
potential hazards to the Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal, x
(3) Assist as assigned or directed in the fighting of
fires or the minimizing of damage as the result of any emergency*
106
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(Li.) Evacuate the area, zone, or shop when directed by the
appropriate Shop Supervisor, Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal, or
Area Coordinator, if not specifically assigned to a Disaster
Control Station.
6.' Hurricane Security
a. All personnel assigned responsibilities by this Instruction,
whether military or civilian, must understand and comply with the
procedures contained in the detailed instructions of the Hurricane
Security, Aircraft Hurricane Evacuation, and Storm Security Bill,
enclosure (5).
b. The basic responsibility of all groups and units in. the
organizational chain of command for disaster control, fire, security
of assigned space, material, and related areas of cognizance is not
altered by the following superimposed organizational responsibilities:
(1) The O&R Fire and Hurricane Marshal shall bo the over-all
coordinating authority under the Assistant O&R Officer for the
.
purpose of hurricane and storm security. He will maintain an
intra-C&R Hurricane Control Center (Hurricane Central) in the Shops
Group Office (extension 279/712).
(2) Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshals have cogniz»ance over
their respective zones, as set forth in enclosure (l), regarding
all matters of hurricane security.
7. Implementation; This Instruction is effective upon receipt
for administration, organization, and training purposes. After
suitable determination as to capability of personnel to comply
with responsibilities stated herein, each individual Fire and
Hurricane Zone will be designated by separate notice as function-
ing operationally under the provisions of this Instruction, It
is anticipated that this Instruction should become fully oper-
ational no later than 1 January 196U,
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ARE A 31
DISASTER CONTROL AREAS (with zoning)
NOTE: Areas 121, 315, and 832 are not included as part of the Disaster
Control Organization. However, these areas will be manned by O&R personnel
in case of fire. Personnel manning these zones will report to other




































































S U C •















OVERHAUL AND REPAIR DEPARTMENT Enclosure (4) O&RINST 3U0.1A
20 June 1963
ZONE DISASTER CONTROL ORGANISATION BOARDS, DRAWINGS, BILLS
(
A - DISASTER CONTROL ORGANIZATION BOARDS
1. Each Disaster Control Area and Zor.e shall display art least one
Disaster Control Organication Board which represents a- composite
planning and action instrument for the disaster control organization
within each unit at the area and zone level, respectively. These
boards will display the name, location, and phone number of each key-
man in the disaster control organization, along with other planning
and training information which will bo developed from time to timo.
In addition, the boards will display a copy of all Disaster Control
Bills for shops within the Zone. The currency of these Area and
Zone Boards shall be the responsibility of the Area Coordinator and
Zone Eire and Hurricane Marshals, respectively. One of these boards
shall be designated as the zone mobilization point. On this board
a space will be provided for indicating the specific shop in which
an emergoncy exists. The person reporting a fire or sounding an
alarm is responsible for assuring that this entry is made, in order
to guide others to the proper locr.tion.
B - DRAWINGS
1. Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshals will coordinate the develop-
ment of an obliquo representative drawing of their respective zones
which will dopict, locate, and code the following items of infor-
mation and equipment; zone boundaries, shop layouts, the location
of all fire fighting equipment within the zone, the location
of all items requiring attention in the event of fire, explosion,
alert, or other emergency which, if left unattended, could lesson
the chance to minimize damage, and the location of all first aid
lockers and boxes, hurricano gear lockers, and damage control gear
lockers.
2. Production Engineering Group will assist, as necessary, in the
preparation and updating of these drawings and will provide for
their distribution as follows: Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal (2),
Disaster Control Area Coordinators (1), Departmental Fire and
Hurricane Marshal (l), Department Damage Control Assistant (2),
Departmental Disaster Control Officer (l), Station Fire Chief U).
Each Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal will insure that one copy of
his respective zone drawing is prominently postod within his zone;
the department Damage Control Assistant .will insure that one copy
is readily av^.ilablo to the department Emergency Recovery Crews
(Plant Services).
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3. Coding . The following coding system is established for the
identification of items as discussed in paragraph 1, above:
a. Fire fighting equipment legend (depicted in RED)














Zone boundaries and fire alarm boxes will be indicated by pictorial
representation on the drawings. Each item will be identified by a
U-unit code, designated on the drawing and on the unit in the zone.
The numerical and color coding system for these units is as follows:
AREA ZONE ITEM ITEM NO.
AREA- CODE ZONE CODE ITEM CODE
Area I I 22U, 227 A (Black) Tank T 0-100
Area II II 3U2, 336 B (Black) Electrical Panel E
3U3, 3l4l C (Black) Valve V
- 3U5, 3U8 D (Black) Door D
3U6, 3U9 E (Black) Window W
3U7 F (Black) Fan








Example : IED 1U Is the 1.Lith coded door in Zone 3U6, Ajrea I
II AX-1 Is the 1st Damage Control Gear Locker in Zone
227, Area II
Enclosure (U) Page 2 of k pages
112
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C - BILLS
la Eaoh shop supervisor under the direction of his respective Zone
Fire and Hurrioane Marshal will r.id in the development of and
assign personnel to a Fire Bill, -Damage Control Bil|, and Hurrioane
Seourity Bill, for the employment of their personnel under speoified
conditions, as follows* 9
a. Fire Bills t Standard Form 6ND-NAS-JAX 11320/5 will be used
to assign personnel to Fire Stations, in accordance with prooedure
set forth in reference (o). Assignments should specifically refer
to the manning of fire fighting equipmont, as depioted in (RE©)' en
Zone Disaster Control Drawings, and shall deal specifically with the
fighting of fires. Assignments as to the closing of doors, windows,
etc, will beoome a part of damage control. Distribution of Fire
Bills will be as follows: Shop (l), Zone Organization Board (l),
O&R Seourity (l), Fire Department (l)» and Area Organization Board
(1).
b. Damage Control Bills : Form 6ND-NAS-JAX 3440/3 (2-63) will
be used to assign personnel to damage control stations, in aooord-
anoe with prooedure set forth in the basio Instruction and this
enclosure.
(1) Equipment requiring attention will be listed on the
Damage Control Bill by the oode referred to above,
(2) Looation of equipment will' be speoified by the terms -
(in shop) or (the outside shop numbor), inoluding any amplifying
data required to looate the item.
(3) Action required shall be specified on the Bill, inoluding
any amplifying data considered neoessary. (The same information
will be speoified by a printed card on the item in the shop.)
(4) Responsibility assignments will be made (l) for equip-
ment within the shop which affects any shop and (2) equipment
looated outside of the speoified shop whioh could have an effeot
on the shop.
(5) Condition requiring aotion:
Condition ALFA -'(item in shop) Aotion neoessary for
safe sodure of own shop , .own zone,
or own area.
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BRAVO - (Item out of shop) Aotion neoessary .
for safe seoure of own shop, own
zone, or own area, but wjll require ,;
•
. responsible person in shpp to notify.
•"'...
, person outside of shop tip/, take
neocssary aotion. - ;.>Z
CHARLIE - (Item in shop) Will require notifi-







(6) Distribution of shop Disaster Control Bills will be
as follows; Shop (l), Zone Organization Board (l), Area Organi-
zation Board (l), Department Damage Control Staff Assistant (l).
C. Each shop shall prepare an itemized Hurrioane Security Bill
as provided for in the basic Instruction. Distribution will bo as
follows: Shop (l), Area Organization Board (l), Zone Organization




1, Some shops will be required to assign personnel to
Damage Control Gear Lookers. These personnel will be referred to
as Ready Resoue Teams and will function as suoh on an immediate
need basis. Ready Rescue Teams will normally supplement Area
Emergenoy Rescue Support Teams when the letter is on Boone.
NOTE: 2. When elootriool storms oause power outage, electrical
power is temporarily lost or some emergenoy requires the seouring
of olootrioal equipment, personnel assigned to suoh essential
equipment will seoure same immediately. The Zone Fire and Hurri--1
oane Marshal will personally coordinate the restoration of equip-
ment to sorvioe after ascertaining from Plant Servioee (phone 729)
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0&R DEPARE;:23T HURRICANE SECURITY;
AIRCRAFT HURRICANE EVACUATION, AND 3T0RM SECURITY BILLS







1. The Overhaul and Repair Department will take 'precautionary
security measures for the zones shown on enclosure (1) to the basic
Instruction and the buildings listed below:
Building Number Designation
101 Overhaul and Repair Building
101-D Air Conditioning Building
101-F Oxygen Overhaul








101-V Plant Maintenance Building
101-X Acetylene Generator
102 Engine Test Cells




146 Ready Ammunition Locker
167 Materials Engineering Division
183 Seaplane Ramp
139 Battery Charging facility
190 Aircraft Cleaning Shed
266 (Structure) Aircraft Power Check Facility
1617 Flight Test Line Shack (North of railroad)
1884 Electronics Storage (Avionics)




202 Control House, Jet Engine Test Cell
202 A&B Jet Engine Test Cells .
202 C&D Fuel Tanks
1562 Storage Building
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i
Building Number (Contd) Designation (Contd)
1710 Storage Building
201 .'.... Storage- Building, Jet Test Cell
Equipment
1570 Storage Building, Magnetic
Detection Equipment
2; Hurricane Conditions . These include the following:
a. Seasonal Condition (1 June - 30 November) . The department
will survey requirements for security and maintain the buildings and
area in full operations, but fully equipped for storm security,
b » Condition IV , (Possible threat of destructive winds within
72 hours,) Initiate preliminary precautionary measures. Continue
general operations,
c. Condition III . (Possible destructive winds within AS hours,)
Continue preliminary security measures. Continue general operations.
d. Condition II , (Destructive winds are anticipated within
24 hours,)
(1) Take security measures which will allow the department
to secure within 12 hours. Continue feasible operations,
(2) When winds of destructive force are expected to reach
the local area within 12 hours, the Executive Officer will order
the complete securing of the station,
e. Condition I , (Destructive winds are imminent,) Take all
possible precautions to safeguard personnel and material, '
3. Reports . The 0&R Fire and Hurricane Marshal will assure that
the following telephone reports are made:
a. A report to the Executive Officer, on or prior to 1 June
each year, that requirements for hurricane season condition have
been met,
b. A report to the Officer-of-the-Day, during Condition II,
when such measures have been taken which would enable the 0&R
Department to secure completely within 12 hours,
c. When complete security of the department is assured, a report
to the Hurricane Officer in the 00D f s office (extension 207/210),
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4. Responsibility . The Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal or his
Alternate shall insure that his zone is in readiness for each
hurricane or storm condition a3 set and that the responsible
supervisors in the administrative chain of command have taken
every possible^ precaution that will minimize damage/to aircraft,
material, shops and spaces, etc., under their cognizance. The
hurricane condition set is indicative of the time Element remaining
until winds of destructive force might threaten the local area and
therefore governs- the scheduling of items to be secured.
a. Seasonal Condition
(1) All externally stored items reviewed by cognizant groups
prior to 1 June with view toward minimizing this category by reducing
backlogs, scrap, salvage, or moving to protected storage. Remaining
noncurrent material should be protected and completely secured.
(2) Zone Fire and. Hurricane Marshals will make a complete
zone inspection listing discrepancies in hurricane security in need .
of correction by Plant Services Division or Public Hbrks (i.e.,
broken windows, etc.). These lists will be submitted to Plant.
Services Division for coordination prior to 1 June. Additional
discrepancies shall be brought to the attention of cognizant group
heads by memorandum for correction, with a copy of the memorandum
to the O&R Fire and Hurricane Marshal.
(3) Each Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal will inspect
special hurricane security gear and other material required for
assuming Condition II. It must be properly tagged, stowed, and in
sufficient quantity for immediate needs. Replenish all deficiencies.
Report prior to 1 June to the Fire and Hurricane Marshal when this
inspection is complete and the lockers contain the required material.
(4) The Departmental Fire and Hurricane Marshal will report
to the O&R Officer when the requirements of the hurricane season
have been met. The O&R Officer will so notify the Executive Officer
on or before 1 June.
'
b. Condition IV
(1) Basically, such items will be secured by cognizant groups
that complete security can be attained within 48 hours.
(2) Cognizant groups will police their areas for debris and
loose items.
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(3) Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshals will inspect their
zones, reporting immediately those items in need of correction to
the responsible supervisor of the area concerned. Zc(ne Fire and
Hurricane Marshals will report by phone (extension 279/712) when
Condition IV security requirements are met in his zone.
c. Condition III
(1) Cognizant groups will attain a degree of security such
that complete security can be attained within 24. hours.
(2) Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshals will inspect their
areas, reporting discrepancies to responsible supervision for
correction. A telephone report will be made to Hurricane Central
(extension 279/712) when Condition III security requirements are met.
(3) Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshals will assign a
telephone watch and notify Hurricane Central of the extension
number.
d. Condition II
(1) Generally, upon assumption of Condition II, the
Production Manager and the 0&R Officer will determine upon a time
of cessation of general operations in order to assure complete
department security within 12 hours. At this time aircraft
stacking (see Part II, Aircraft Hurricane Evacuation Bill) is
usually initiated.
(2) All personnel are available to and will report to their
Sub-Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal as required for working parties.
(3) The Aircraft Transfer Officer will assign 5 percent of
his enlisted personnel complement to report to the Chief Master-at-
Arms, Barracks "D" for duty in emergency working parties. The
station 00D will notify the department when these men are required,
(4.) 'ihen Condition II security requirements are met, Zone
Fire and Hurricane Marshals will so report to the Hurricane Central
(extension 279/712). When Condition II security requirements are
met throughout the department, the station 00D will be notified
by 0&R Fire and Hurricane Marshal or his Alternate.
(5) When destructive winds are expected to reach the local
area within 12 hours, the Executive Officer will order the complete
securing of the station.
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PART II - AIRCRAFT HURRICANE EVACUATION BILL •
A. GENERAL {
1. Reference (e) of the basic Instruction is applicable to the
O&R Department although there normally will be no evacuation of
aircraft of the department; they will be stored within the assigned
hangar spaces, thus becoming part of the Hurricane Security Bill,
2. The following local action is appropriate to the aircraft
hurricane evacuation condition set:
a* Condition IV (72 hours prior to forecast arrival)
(1) Continue flight operations.
(2) O&R Fire and Hurricane Marshal will submit Hurricane
Evacuation Data Report (Form OP ATC 3730/1 ) to HECO (building 118, .
room 201).
b. Condition III (48 hours prior to forecast arrival)
, (1) Secure flight operations except locals by special .
permission of the station Operations Officer. " >l
(2) Hurricane Security Officer 'Jill submit revised Hurricane
Evacuation Data Report to HECO by special messenger (even though no
changes have occurred).
(3) O&R Fire and Hurricane Marshal will make advance plans
for storage of all aircraft.
(a) Dispatch Division Superintendent will report to the
O&R Fire and Hurricane Marshal to act as a special assistant in the
coordination of aircraft storage (transportation, move crews, etc.).
(b) Hold pre-storage conference and briefing with
layout boards attended by hurricane aircraft storage team.
1
(c) Notify station HECO of areas for aircraft storage
surplus to O&R needs. Receive extra aircraft storage assignment
from HECO, and hold coordination conference with custodian of
assigned aircraft regarding location of storage, schedule, and. areas
of responsibility, i.e., moving and hangaring the aircraft.
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c. Condition II (24 hours prior to forecast arrival)
(1) Hold final storage conference, assigning personnel,
equipment, and move crews to each storage area. Coordination is
achieved through Hurricane Central (extension 279/712).
(2) Commence storage when directed by the 0<$R Officer,
i
(3) Coordinate final storage requirements with HECO,
attempting to retain all surplus area in a central location where
it will be available to the Fleet (i.e., east end of 101 and
hangar 122).
d. Condition I (12 hours prior to forecast arrival). Assist
HECO as able in storage of remaining aircraft. Secure unhangared
aircraft in best possible manner; remove or secure loose gear,
B. RESPONSIBILITY
1. The following assignments are made to the hurricane aircraft
storage team:
a. The 0&R Fire and Hurricane Officer is responsible to the
0&R Officer for the safe and expeditious storage of aircraft,
b. The Dispatch Division Superintendent (and assistant as
required) will assist the Hurricane Security Officer, furnishing
transportation and move crews, etc:
c. The Shops Group Manpower Section Supervisor will provide
manpower coordination through Hurricane Central (extension 279/712).
(1) All personnel, regardless of group, are responsible to
their Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal during Hurricane Condition II
and I,
(2) Aircraft Storage Officers will utilize manpower supplied
by the Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal of the area involved,
(3) Coordination and movement of manpower from zone to zone
will be achieved through Hurricane Central (extension 279/712).
Zone Marshals will assign a telephone watch and notify Hurricane
Central of the extension number.
(4) Securing of personnel will be directed from Hurricane
Central through the Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal.
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d. The following area supervisory assignments a*re made for
aircraft storage : . •
• Hangar . Principal ; Alternate
101-W 5100 Branch Supervisor 5100 Branch Quarterman
101 * 5300 3ranch Supervisor £300 Branch Quarterman
101-S
. ;
3100 Branch Supervisor 3100 Branch Quarterman
122 % 5200 Branch Supervisor 2100 Branch Supervisor
e. As each hangar area is stored and security completed, a report
will be made to Hurricane Central (extension 279/712).
PART III - STORM SECURITY BILL
A. GENERAL
1. The basic organization established in Fart I, Hurricane Security
Bill, is responsible in like manner for the implementation of this
Bill. ..•
2. Reference (f) of the basic Instruction contains the following
conditions
:
a. Gale/Storm Condition IV (Use applicable term). Trend
indicates a possible threat of destructive winds of force indicated .
within 72 hours.
b. Gale/Storm Condition III (Use applicable term). Destructive
winds of force indicated are possible within 48 hours. Take
preliminary precautions.
c. Thunderstorm/Tornado/Gale/Storm Condition II (Use applicable
term). Destructive winds of force indicated are anticipated within
24 hours, or, in the case of thunderstorms or tornadoes, are reported
or expected in the general area. Take precautions that will permit
establishment of an appropriate Condition of .Readiness on short notice.
(1) II CHARLIE. Winds' up to 33 knots are anticipated in the
local area within 24 hours; take such precautions as may be necessary.
(2) II BRAVO . Winds between 34 and 47 knots are anticipated
in the local area within 24 hours. Take precautions necessary to
provide adequate protection.
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(3) JI ALFA . Destructive winds 48 knots or greater of force
and type indicated are anticipated within 24 hours. Take
appropriate precautions to minimize damage. NOTE: When
Condition II ALFA is set, a complete storm description will accompany




d. Thunderstorm/Tornado/Gale/Storm Condition j (Use applicable
term). Destructive winds of force indicated are imminent. Take
appropriate precautions to minimize damage.
(1) I CHARLIE . Winds up to 33 knots are in the local area;
take such precautions as may be necessary.
(2) I BRAVO . Winds between 34. and 47 knots are in the local
area. Take precautions necessary to provide adequate protection.
(3) I ALFA . Destructive winds 48 knots or greater of force
and type as indicated are imminent. Take appropriate precautions
to minimize damage. NOTE: When Condition I ALFA is set, a complete
storm" description will accompany the setting of the condition.
B. RESPONSIBILITY
1. Hurricane Central will receive information on storm conditions
from the O&R Security office and will relay it to Shops Group
divisions and to the other groups.
2. All groups are responsible for security of aircraft, material,
and areas under their cognizance as follows:
a. Condition IV . No action.
b. Condition III . Police area removing debris and checking
security and protection of externally stored material.
<*• Condition II (CHARLIE, BRAVO, or ALFA)
(1) Continue normal operations.
(2) Check that security of externally stored material is in
conformity with expected winds.
(3) Tie dovjn all exposed aircraft with wheels chocked.
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d. Condition I CHARLIE (33 knots)
» j
(1) Tie down all exposed aircraft with wheels chocked.
(2) Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshals check area for security.
e. .Condition I BRAVO (34 to /+7 knots) f
(1) Secure -exposed aircraft with double tie-down, wheel
chacks secured to aircraft, helicopter blades secured,
(2) Zone Firo and Hurricane Marshals check area for security
and report completion to Hurricane Central (extension 279//12).
f. Condition I ALFA (Destructive winds above 4# knots)
(1) Hangar all RFI helicopters and those having completed
assembly (including FFT).
•
(2) Fixed wing aircraft headed into prevailing wind and
secured as in subparagraph e(l) above.
(3) Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal check area for security
and report completion to Hurricane Central (extension 279/712),
g. Hail Warning . Will generally require action as in f(l)
above, and may require more extensive security as detailed at the
time.
3. Prior to completing work each workday, the area will be secured
in conformity with tho requirements of Storm Condition II.
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The' term disaster warning includes the terms Fire Alarm, Emergency
Signal for impending attack, and Hurricane Warning Signals as
appropriate. ' These alarm signals should be prominently posted in all
shops and on all bulletin boards adjacent to Disaster Control Bills J
SECTION I: EMERGENCY SIGNALS AND ACTIONS
r imiiMiiri i ^im. m^w. wmmmm w—wm mw - -*— 1 "
SIGNALS ACTIONS
A A steady blast of 3 to $
L minutes. (Steam -whistles
E will sound at NAS Power
R Plant No. 2 and at the
T Naval Hospital Power House.
A horn signal will sound in
0&R bldg. 101 and Hanger
101-A. Audible signals will
be backed up by oral
instructions passed by
telephone and by security
patrol cars.)
This signal means that attack by
hostile aircraft is probable.
On this signal NAS Station personnol
assigned to active defense duties,
security guards, fire-fighting
personnel, personnel 'required for
operating or securing utility systems
and those required to perform other
essential functions will remain at
their duty stations.
NAS St-.tion Disaster Control Groups
\rill muster at pre-designatod martial
points, obtain team equipment and await
further instructions.
05R Damage Control personnel will place
Departmental Damage Control Eills in
effect, alter which those specifically
designated to take shelter in the area
will do so.
All o'ttier civilian and military personnel
not included above should evacuate the
station immediately and report, to
evacuee assembly area, NRTC Gainesville,
Florida. (See NAS JAX Evacuation Chart





A series of short blasts of This signal means that attack by hostile
3 minutes duration. (Warning aircraft is imminent 'or is taking place.
will be passed In the same
manner as above.)











OVERHAUL AND REPAIR DEPARTMENT
All personnel should seek immediate
shelter. If no warning is given and a
blinding flash or1 a tremendous earth
shock is experienced and you are - - -#
IN A BUILDING - iSeek' an interior corridor
or room with a small window area and lie
face down on the floor alongside a wall
or under a heavy desk or tabic,
OUTSIDE - Lio face down, preferable in a
ditch or depression on the ground with
hands covering the back of the head,
IN A CAR - Open the vi ndows to reduce the
danger from flying glass and lie down on
the floor boards.
Buildings designated as shelters are
indicated on NAS JAX Evacuation Chart









There is no audible ALL
CLEAR signal. Oral
instructions will bo passed
by security patrol cars or
by telephone when danger
is over.
Do NOT leave shelters or the evacuation
area until told to do so. Fall-out or
further attacks may occur.
The ALL CLEaR will also bo broadcast by
commercial radio. In this area tune
radios to 61*0 or 12^0 XC,
SECTION II: O&R DISASTER OR FIRE ALARM SIGNALS
a. Devices- Station level Is Signal is audible only at control points
and not throughout the station,
b. Devices within O&R Fire signals (Bells except zone 22U) sounded
after the alarm has been turned in are as follows:
SIGNAL ALL CLEAR SIGNAL
AREA
I A series of very short rings evenly distributed,
II A SGries of very short rings grouped in two's.
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3U1, 3U2 Short rings on the work bell
3U3, 3h$ equivalent to the number of the
3I46, 3U7 subzone, Subzone number will
3U8, 3U9 normally be sounded 3 times.
22U k short blasts on the air horn to
be sounded 3 times.
3 short rings on the
work bell sounded once*
3 short blasts on the
air horn sounded once.






sounded by O&R Security
to correspond with appropriate
fire zone signal.
7 short rings on the work bell
to be sounded 3 times.
6 short rings on the alarm
bell to be sounded 3 times.
3 short rings on the
work bell to be sounded
once,
3 short rings on the
bell to be sounded once.
ACTION : Personnel assigned Fire Stations will man their stations. All
personnel within the affected zone will become alert but continue
operations until further notice. Shop Damage Control personnel will
activate shop, zone or area damage control measures when directed. All
other personnel within an affected shop, zone or area will evacuate
when directed,
SECTION III : HURRICANE WARNING SIGNALS AND PROCEDURES
The Overhaul and Repair Security Office will act as a Department Duty
Office in receipt and dissemination of hurricane security condition
information:
a. During working hours the Security Office will notify the O&R
Officer, Assistant 0&3 Officer, and O&R Fire and Hurricane Marshal
(Shops Officer) on receipt of hurricane information. The Shops
Group Office (Hurricane Central) will notify (l) all Disaster Control
Area Coordinators and/or alternates (2) all O&R Department group heads
(3) all Shops Group division superintendents.
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b. During non-working hours the Security Office will notify
the O&R Officer, Assistant O&R Officer, and O&R Fire and Hurricane.
Marshal when Hurricane Conditions IV, IH, II, and I are set and
the Aircraft '.transfer Officer when Hurricane Evacuation Condition II
is sot. All departmental personnel required for security may bo
recalled.
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ADMOTSTRATI7E AND OPERATIONAL INSPECTION FORM
FOR DISASTER CONTROL TEAMS : .. .
AREA LEVEL AND BELOW
'A. ADMINISTRATIVE
1 —i i .
1». Area Coordinator
(a^ Has the Area Coordinator prepared and located area Disaster
Control Organization Bills? Yes No
(b) Is the Area Coordinator cognizant of, Distaster Control
Organizational Boards, Drawings, and Bills within his various zones?
... Yes No
, .(c) Have review requirements for personnel assignments
to Disaster Control Bills been established? Yes^ No
(d) Have Zone Damage Control gear material requirements
been reviewed? Yes Mo
(e) Does the Area Coordinator have a feeling for the most
important drills within his area that should be conducted?
-..'.. Yes No
(f) Has a drill been scheduled in the past quarter?
Yes No
2. Support Teams * , '•"'•
(a/ First Aid
(1) Is the First Aid Team Leader aware of his team
compliment? Yes No
(2) Are records on training being kept for qualification
purDoses? Yes No
(3) Are custody records keot of First Aid equipment?
Yes No
(U) Are inventories made of supplies? Yes No
(5) Is storage adequate? Yes t .No
(6) Does the First Aid Team Leader understand who he is
responsible to. and when? Yes No
(7) Are First Aid Team" Members evenly distributed among
the various zones? Yes No
..(b) EiK,rgency Rescue
(1) Is the Team Leader, aware of the compliment of his
team? Ye s No
(2) Is training in rescue techniques being conducted
and records being kept? Yes No
...
. (3) Is Emergency rescue equipment mobile, and is it
readily available? Yes No
(I.) Has the Team Leader reviewed material requirements
for Zone Damage Control (tear Lockers and made additional needs known
to the Departmental Disaster Control Staff Assistant? Yes
;
No
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(5) Does the Team Leader know who he is responsible to,
and when? Yes No
(6) Do Team Members understand what their, function is?
-"
Yes No
(c) Area Communication and Traffic Team
(1) Does the Team Leader understand the compliment of
his team? Yes No
(2) Are training requirements being established?
Yes No
(3) Do Team Members understand their function?
Yes No
(U) Does the Team Leader understand who he is responsible
to, and when? Yes No
3» Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal
(aj ivari the Marshal developed Disaster Control Bills, training,
and equipment 'equirements for his zone? Yes No
(b) AC.y Zone Disaster Control Organization Boards properly-
prepared and orominently located? • Yes No
^
(c) Have material requirements for Disaster Control Gear Lockers
been developed so as to provide for unique rescue? Yes No
(d) Does the Marshal understand the organizational relation-
ships of the Bill? Yes No
(e) Doe;i the Marshal have ideas concerning drills which
should be conducted? Ye s No
(f
)
Are results of monthly fire equipment inspections
reported monthly, and bo whom? Yes No
•
(g) What plans has the Marshal initiated for the use of his
assigned personnel to effect hurricane security?
O
A* Fire Team Leaders
(a) Does the lire Team Leader understand his responsibility
concerning functional control of assigned fire fighting personnel?
Yes No
(b) Are ::one fire fighting personnel properly trained in xhe
use of equipment? Yes No
!>• Damage Control Team
(a) Dees' the Damage Control Team Leader understand the




(b) Are .Damage Control Training Flans being implerkor-tod?
(c) Har equipment requiring attention been properJy'iabe/.-ed
as to action required? Yes No
(d) Has the Team Leader prepared or reviewed a list of
equipment and facilities found within his zcne which require some type
of attention in the event of emergency? Yes No
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(e) Dpes the Damage Control Team Leader understand the criteria





6« Shop Supervisors • ..,...'-
{a.) Did) the Shop Supervisor assist in the preparation of
the Disaster Control Equipment and Facilities survey?' Yes No
(b) Did the Shop Supervisor assist in the preparation of
material for Disaster Control Gear Lockers? Yes m No
(c)-Are Disaster Control Bills prominently posted within
each shop? . Yes No
(d) Has the Shop Supervisor explained . necessary portions of
Disaster Control Instruction to his assigned personnel? Yes No
(e) Does the Shop Supervisor understand his responsibilities
concerning the function and control of personnel assigned to Shop
Disaster Control Bill? Yes No
7* Security Force - ....
- (a) Does the Security Force understand the proper method of
sounding Disaster Control alarms? Yes No , Fire alarms? Yes No,
Alarm signals throughout the Department? Yes No •
(b) Do the Security Guards understand their responsibilities
for providing communication capabilities to appropriate mobilization
points in the event of an alert? . . Yes No
(c) Does the Security Department understand, their responsi-
bilities for reporting fire and damage hazards? Yes No
8 • shops Personnel
Taj Do personnel understand their assignments to Disaster
Control Station?? Yes No
(b) Do personnel understand when and where to evacuate if
directed? Yes No „ Are alarm signals understood? Yes No
•(c) Do Shops Personnel understand the Damage Control coding
system (this is not expected to be memorised)? Yes No
(d) Do personnel assigned to Disaster Control Gear Lockers
understand the use of the equipment within these lockers? Yes_ No
Do they understand their function? Yes . No
(e) Do personnel understand what to do in the event of







It is contemplated that three basic drills will be oarried out,
as follows:
!• A very small fire within a designated shop.
2* A larger fire within a shop which could progress into a zone
emergency*
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3. A zorie emergency which could progress into an &rea emergency.









Z Z Z Z -
Specify situations* enacted—Fire
_
„»,. — — — — — -..



















The response to the following items will be noted and evaluated:
1» Did Shops Personnel react immediately? Yes No
2« Did the Shops Supervisor place his Fire and Disaster Control
Bill into effect? Yes No
3« Was the incident reported to the Fire Department? Yes No
By whom?
m
h» Did the Shop Supervisor secure his shop, or any other shop?
Yes No
Evaluate the judgment used by the Supervisor concerning the securing
of his shop,
m
5. Did Zone Fire~and~Damage Control Team Leaders assume functional
control of all personnel assigned to their Disaster Control Team?
Yes No
6. Did the Zone Fire and Hurricane Marshal control the function
of the Zone Teams? Ye s No
7. How were Zone Team functions coordinated?
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8* Did the Marshal secure the entire Zone or any other Zone?








10. Did the Emergency Rescue Support Team" report to the scene?
Yes No . Who did they report to?
m ^ _ —
Did they assume control of Disaster Control~Ready"Rescue Teams?"" Yes
No . How? _
._ m _




12. Did First Aid Team Members report to the scene? Yes No
What were their actions?
13»~" Did the Security~Guard with~Kandy-Talkie reporVto the Area""
Mobilization Point? Yes No . Was he utilized? Yes No
How? J"""_ _~_ A
~_
Hi. Was the Disaster Control Area"Coordinator kept informed""of
the progress of the incident? Yes No
15* Did the Area Coordinator assume operational control of the
members of his support team? Yes No » Evaluate the judgment of
the Area Coordinator concerning the use of his assigned personnel.
Was the Area secured? Yes""
""
No "
16. Did the Area Coordinator keep departmental staff informed of
the progress of the incident? Yes No • How? ^
_ _ — — __ — _
""
"17 ."" Did he""request""assistance?"" Yes No "" 7 "if so7 whaV*type?~"
"lo7.
-
Did the C&R Disaster""Control"Officer~as"sume control of"either









1. Name of Company^
2. Principal Product
3. Size of Company
a. No • of Buildings (if company is located in more than 1 c&ty
s
please give comparative average figure
b. Production floor space
c. Estimate of Capital Investment^
d* No. of employees
(1) $> of employees involved in indirect labor,
(2) # of employees involved in direct labor
,




g. Percent government contracts of total business
_ ___
4. Major Production Operation (s)& Underline @n@ or more each Hne„
a. Assembly, Fabrication,, Job Shop, Machinery » Processing &
other
m
b. Metal, Wood 9 Plastic^ Chemicals, Paper 9 Foodstuff, Petroleiam
Products, Gas, other








Are special precautions required and taken for plant and <anpl©yee
protection because of geographical location susceptible to Fire,
Flood, Earthquake, Hurricane, Explosion, Tornado , etco
„ , „,,,,
a. Which factor(s) do you consider worthy of consideration.
b# What precaution(s) have you taken,
6. Safety Programs
&• Briefly describe programs in force (first-Aid, Industrial
Safety, Fire Prevention, Disaster Control, other_
b. Organizational assignments for Program(s) responsibilities*
who in the line/staff company organization is responsible for what
c. Are instructions and procedures in force promulgating pro«
gram requirements
mit ir ___
d. Are courses, drills, other instructional programs conducted




(1) How often and for what length of time_
(2) How are drills simulated
e. Do employees participate as members of First-Aid Teams,
Disaster Control Teams
If yes, what team(s) and what participation.
f . What is extent of First-Aid or medical facility available
(1) First-Aid Chests or Lockers
(2) Dispensary
(3) Nurse(s) on Duty_
(4) Doctor(s) on Duty.
(5) Other
g. What types of Fire Protection equipment do you utilize
(1) COp or Chemical Extinguishers,
(2) Sprinkler System
(3) Fire Hose Reels
W Fire Truck(s),
(5) Full time Company Fire Dept,
7» External Services
a. What Medical, Fire, and other services are available from the
335

community in case of accident, injury, fire 9 or disaster within plant
b. With respect to time, approximately how fast is each outside
service able to respond to a call for assistance
c. Is there an established plan or program for mutual cooperation
between industries and the community in the event of a large scale
disaster
d. Describe your plant participation in Civil Defense Program.
In the event of warning for all-out attack, do you have written
instructions which deal with the securing of the plant and its
equipment (a passive measure to reduce possible damage)
8. Statistics
a. What has been the yearly average number of lost time accidents
and incidents at your plant
, «_____»«„«__ .
b« What has this constituted in lost man-hours_
c. Were estimates made as to dollar impact on production.
d. Comment on recent significant lost time occurrence
e. Describe one or more fires in your plant in terms of property
136

loss, cause, to what extent or lack of same working personnel as-
sisted in controlling the emergency! other assistance and was
assistance pre-organized
9. Insurance
a. Is company self-insured or insured through insurance under-
writer
b. What is approximate extent of insurance for personnel liability
c. What is approximate extent of insurance for investment pro-
tection
d« Has there been any tendency for insurance rates to climb or
fall during the past five to ten years and to what is the change
attributed to
10 • Do we have permission to quote the above information directly with
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